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Abstract 
 
Reduction of Observable Robbery and Larceny-Theft in the 
Twelve Largest Cities in the United States from 1980 to 2009 
by 
 
Andrew J. Costello 
Advisor: Professor Maria (Maki) Haberfeld 
 
The reduction in crime rates that occurred in large cities across the United States (US) 
over the course of the past two decades has been the subject of much speculation and research. 
However, there have been no definitive empirical studies that conclusively determine the causes 
for this phenomenon.  The goal of this study is to identify the impact of certain factors to the 
reduction of crime in large US cities that occurred over the past two decades by examining data 
over a thirty-year period (1980-2009).   The identification of contributing factors may allow 
government officials, both on a local and national level, to focus their efforts on the 
implementation of policies that, based on empirical study, are likely to reduce crime. 
This study focuses on Observable Crime, which is operationalized as robberies and 
larcenies reported in the Uniform Crime Report (UCR) Part II Offenses that were likely to be 
visible to the police. Those crimes likely to be visible police are determined to be all robberies 
that were not committed in residences and larcenies that were committed in public areas 
excluding stores.  Law enforcement strategies that were examined in this study include Quality 
of Life (QOL) Enforcement and Police Presence, which is operationalized as arrests for drug 
offenses as reported in UCR Part II Arrests and Police Officers per 100,000 residents as reported 
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in the UCR, respectively.  The findings of this research supports the hypothesis that Quality of 
Life Enforcement significant in reducing crime in the twelve largest US cities from 1980-2009.       
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I. Introduction 
 
 The crime rate across the US has decreased significantly since the mid-1990’s, a shift 
from the upward trend that began in the 1960’s.  The 1990s had a dramatic reduction in crime in 
comparison to the late eighties and this trend continued.  While many politicians, practitioners 
and academics have provided their theories regarding this historic decrease in criminal activity, 
few studies have critically examined this reduction with any statistical rigor.  The increase in 
Police Presence, which is operationalized as the number of police officers per 100,000 residents, 
was considered a likely reason for the decrease.  Quality of Life (QOL) Enforcement, as defined 
to be drug arrests, was another factor considered to be a possible cause to the crime reduction in 
the 1990s.  This study analyzed the effect of Police Presence and Quality of Life (QOL) 
Enforcement on the reduction of Observable Crime, that is, robberies and larcenies that are in 
view of the police officers.   
This study is unique in comparing cities over a time span of 30 years with local data.  
While researchers have focused on national and state data, there has been very little recent focus 
on city level analysis with the use of time series.  Analysis of program effectiveness at the city 
level is important because programs are more easily executed at small municipal levels.  
Ultimately, national and state programs are executed at the local level.  Using expectations of 
program effectiveness from national and state studies that gather data in aggregate will be 
problematic.  Most national and state level effects appear to be inflated when compared to 
analyses conducted on more local units such as counties, suburb, or cities. 
A review of the literature will demonstrate a lack of recent analyses of city level data.  
Additionally, previous studies of city level data lacked proper controls by utilizing methods of 
either interpolation of decennial data, or using the decennial value as a constant for years before 
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or after the decennial year.  The assumption that these rates would either follow an even, linear 
direction between years, or that the values would remain fixed, was never tested or supported. 
Aspects of deterrence and rational choice theory were supported in addition to a main 
principal of “Broken Windows”.   Through QOL Enforcement, offenders were deterred from 
committing crimes in areas that were reclaimed.  Celerity, a key component of deterrence, in the 
enforcement of minor offenses may have dissuaded would be perpetrators from committing 
Observable Crimes.  QOL Enforcement likely prevented motivated offenders from committing 
Observable Crimes by being displaced from victims or seeing capable guardians in the vicinity 
of areas were Observable Crimes could be committed satisfying the removal of two components 
needed for a crime to occur under rational choice theory.  The main tenet of “Broken Windows is 
enforcement of low level offenses to create an environment of non-tolerance for disorder. 
Through examination of Observable Crime of the twelve largest cities in the US, QOL 
Enforcement was determined to be a significant factor in the reduction of these “Observable 
Crimes”.  A General Linear Model was created to test the effectiveness of Police Presence and 
QOL Enforcement to examine thirty years of quantitative data from the twelve largest US cities.  
The results show promising and feasible solution for the implementation of QOL Enforcement 
strategies.  While the study has limitations, suggestions for new research are proposed as well as 
new measures to capture necessary elements of crime reduction. 
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II. Literature Review  
 
A. Crime Reduction in General 
 
Most explanations of the crime reduction of the 1990s seems to focus on single factors 
and do not bring together several factors simultaneously.  Compendiums looking at several 
factors are extremely limited.  First, works that look at several factors will be presented.  
Individual articles explaining the reduction of crime based off of a single factor will then follow.  
A discussion of the literature will follow showing the need for longitudinal study of cities. 
Eck and Maguire (2000) examined several studies about changes in policing strategies 
and management focusing on community policing, quality of life enforcement, COMPSTAT, 
number of police officers, police expenditures, police by area, gun interdiction patrols, and retail 
drug enforcement throughout the nation.  While they do not conclude any particular style or 
method from any particular study contributed to crime decline, they did not rule out that some of 
these methods must have had some effect.  In particular, they did find that directed patrol to hot 
spots did reduce crime (Eck & Maguire, 2000). 
Levitt (2004) explored the national trend in crime reduction in a more comprehensive 
manner by investigating innovative policing strategies, increased reliance on prisons, changes in 
crack/other drug markets, aging of the population, tougher gun control laws, strong economy, 
and increased number of police officers.  He further determined four factors to be significant: 
increased incarceration, more police, the decline of crack and legalized abortion.  Levitt 
examined several factors, analyzed separately; however, he did not look at the interaction of each 
variable collectively (Levitt S. , 2004). 
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 Zimring (2007) examined the decline in crime, with a focus on imprisonment, 
demographic changes, economy, number of police, decline in use of crack cocaine, and access to 
abortion.  While he determined that the decline in crime is real and not an anomaly, none of the 
factors played a dominant role.  Zimring dedicated a chapter specifically to New York, 
attributing the additional decline above the national average to more aggressive policing and 
management changes in the NYPD amongst the other previously mentioned factors.  However, 
as with Levitt, he did not look at the factors collectively with each other nor did he use any 
quantitative model to come to his conclusions (Zimring, 2007). 
B. Crime Reduction by Subject 
 
After reviewing the three major works on reduction of crime in the 1990s, most 
explanations in the reduction of crime fall into six subjects: police, prisons, guns, drugs, 
economics, and COMPSTAT.  While several research articles reference more than one of the 
subject areas in their model design, this literature review will present a particular study in the 
section of the most dominant explanation of the study.  For example, if a study involved guns 
and drugs and concluded that guns were a significant factor over drugs, the study would be 
placed in the guns section.  
1. Police 
 
The study of police effectiveness on crime has been ongoing since the 1970s.  The studies 
vary in the use of police officers, police employees, and police expenditures as the independent 
variable and vary in method between cross-sectional, panel, and time series.  The only 
consistency in the studies is the use of UCR Part I crimes as the dependent variable.  Cross-
sectional and panel studies will be presented first followed by time series studies. 
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a) Police Cross-sectional and Panel Studies 
 
Studies from 1971 through 1974 focused on cross-sections of cities on police employees 
and police expenditures on violent crime with mixed results.  Increases in violent crime related to 
increased police employees ( (Morris & Tweeten, 1971); (Greenwood & Wadycki, 1973)) and 
decreases in violent crime associated with police expenditures were found (Swimmer, 1974a) 
(Swimmer, 1974b).  Additionally, Wellford, in two separate cross sections, determined no effect 
on violent crime due to police expenditures (Wellford, 1974). 
Levine also examined police employees and determined an increase in murder and 
robbery when conducting a cross-sectional analysis of 26 cities in 1961, but found the effects 
were negated when a panel study of the same cities was performed using change in police 
employees from 1961 and 1971 (Levine, 1975).   Pogue studied 163 SMSAs in a cross-sectional 
analysis for the effect of police expenditures on violent crime in three separate years and had 
mixed results between years.  The study, overall, showed no effect on murder, rape, robbery, and 
assault for 1962 and 1968, but found positive correlation for rape and robbery in 1967  (Pogue, 
1975). 
Mathieson and Passell conducted a study of 65 NYPD police precincts in 1971 and 
determined that uniformed patrolman had a negative effect on robbery (Mathieson & Passell, 
1976). Hakim, Ovadia, and Weinblatt examined police expenditures in 61 Philadelphia suburbs 
in 1970 and determined that the expenditures were positively correlated to robberies per acre  
(Hakim, Ovadia, & Weinblatt, 1978).  Fuji and Mak performed a cross-sectional study of 25 
districts in Oahu examining the effect of police per acre and found that robberies and assaults 
were positively correlated (Fuji & Mak, 1980).  Huff and Stahura examine 252 suburbs in the US 
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for the effect of police employees on violent crime and found a positive correlation (Huff & 
Stahura, 1980).      
Humphries and Wallace conducted a panel and cross-sectional study of 23 cities.  The 
panel study found an increase in murder with an increase in change in police from 1950 to 1971.  
The cross-sectional study found no difference in robberies in 1971 based on 1970 police staffing 
(Humphries & Wallace, 1980).  Greenberg and Kessler performed a panel study of 130 cities’ 
police expenditures for 1960 and 1962 and found a positive effect on violent crime (Greenberg & 
Kessler, 1982).   
Greenberg, Kessler, and Loftin conducted a panel study of 252 suburbs and 269 cities of 
police employees on violent crime and found no effect for the suburbs and a positive effect on 
violent crime for the cities (Greenberg, Kessler, & Loftin, 1983).   Belknap examined 260 
SMSAs for the effect of 1980 police expenditures on violent crime and found none (Belknap, 
1986).  Howsen and Jarrell examined 120 Kentucky Counties for the effect of police per square 
mile in 1981 and found a negative correlation to robberies (Howsen & Jarrell, 1987).   
After the 1980s, analyses of police switch from cross-sectional analysis to time series.  
Niskansen performed a cross-sectional analysis of all 50 US states and Washington, DC for the 
effect of police employees on violent crime in 1991 and found no effect (Niskansen, 1994).  This 
seems to be the last cross-sectional analysis involving Police Presence and crime.  While cross-
sectional analyses have their place, the results were confusing and in conflict with each other.  
Ultimately, the problem with cross-sectional analyses is establishing which is the causal factor: 
the police or crime.  Arguments could be made that areas with more Police Presence have fewer 
crimes or that areas with high crimes demand a higher Police Presence.   
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b) Police Time Series 
 
The first time series testing the effect of police on violent crime used US aggregate data 
from 1947-1972.  Land and Felson found that police expenditures had a negative impact on 
violent crime (Land & Felson, 1976).  Fuji and Mak conducted a time series study for the State 
of Hawaii from 1961 through 1975 that examined the effect of police on murder, rape, robbery, 
and assault and none were found (Fuji & Mak, 1980).   Jacob and Rich examined a time series of 
nine cities from 1948-1978 on police expenditures and found a positive correlation to robbery 
(Jacob & Rich, 1980).  Loftin and McDowall conducted a time series of Detroit from 1926-1977 
of the effect of police employees on violent crime and found none (Loftin & McDowall, 1982).   
Corman and Joyce conducted a time series for the effect of police officers on murder, 
rape robbery, and assault using monthly data from 1970-1986 for New York City.  Controlling 
for unemployment and home relief, robbery was found to be negatively affected by the rate of 
police officers per 1,000 citizens over 16 years of age (Corman & Joyce, 1990).  
Chamlin and Langworthy conducted a time series of police employees, patrol employees, 
and detective employees in Milwaukee from 1930-1987 on personal crime and robbery.  No 
effect was found except for a positive relationship between the number of detective employees 
and robberies (Chamlin & Langworthy, 1996).   Corman and Mocan examined economic and 
enforcement efforts on Part I crime in New York City from 1974-1999 and found that broken 
windows enforcement, as measured by misdemeanor arrests, had validity in reduction of 
robbery, grand larceny, and automobile theft (Corman & Mocan, 2005).   
Marvell and Moody examined the effect of police rate on UCR Part I crimes in a pooled 
time series with data from 49 states from 1968 to 1993 and 65 cities from 1971 to 1992.  The 
researchers controlled for age structure and African-American population from data obtained 
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from the US Census decennial data at the state level and interpolated between years.  Another 
control variable for poverty level was interpolated from studies of the US Census at the state 
level for 1969, 1975, and 1979-1993.  Population, income, and employment data were also 
controlled for by data obtained from the Department of Commerce.  Prison population at the 
state level by year was added as the last control.  The researchers use a Granger causality test to 
determine that rising crime effects police levels, that is, hiring, and a larger police rate reduced 
crime in all Part I crimes at the city level (Marvell & Moody, 1996). 
Levitt (1997) conducted a pooled time series-cross-sectional model of 59 US cities for 
data from 1970 through 1992 using UCR Part I crimes and sworn officers per 100,000 at the city 
level.   Levitt controlled for percent black, percent female headed household, and percent age 15-
24 by using decennial data and interpolated by year.  Additionally, the controls for welfare and 
education spending were produced by combining state and local outlays per capita adjusted for 
inflation.  The state unemployment rate was used as an additional control.  Although the focus of 
the study was to determine if mayoral elections had an effect on hiring practices of police 
officers, Levitt did determine that police levels did have an impact on murder, robbery, 
aggravated assault, and auto theft (Levitt S. D., 1997). 
Time series are a considerable improvement over cross-sectional studies and overall have 
demonstrated that the police have a negative effect on crime.  Specifically, Land and Felson, 
Corman and Joyce, Corman and Mocan, Marvel and Moody, and Levitt reported a negative 
impact of Police Presence on crime when using either police employees or police officers.  Jacob 
and Rich reported a positive effect of Police Presence on robbery using police expenditures.  Fuji 
and Mak, and Loftin and McDowall did not show any effect when using police and police 
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employees respectively.  All of the studies had difficulty finding reliable yearly data for social 
controls. 
2. Prison Rate 
 
Prison research became consistent in reporting in 1978 due to a report commissioned by 
the National Research Council summarizing the results of research in the 1970s.  As a result of 
critiques from this report (Blumstein, Cohen, & Nagin, 1978), the concept of elasticity, that is the 
percentage change in crime resulting from a one percent change in prison population, was 
established as comparison method between studies.  
Three studies using national data followed after this report.  Devine, Sheley, and Smith 
conducted a national time series with data from 1948 to 1985 testing male unemployment, 
inflation, relief (public spending to aid families with dependent children), and prison rate.  The 
relief variable was interpolated from data available for certain reporting years from the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis.  The researchers discovered elasticities of -1.47 for homicide, -2.62 for 
robbery, and -1.90 for burglary (Devine, Sheley, & Smith, 1988).  Cappell and Sykes conducted 
a national study using data from 1933-1985 and discovered an elasticity of 0.91 for the effect of 
prison rate on all index crimes (Cappell & Gresham, 1991). 
While focusing on the effect of imprisonment on homicide, Marvel and Moody 
conducted a study of national data from 1930-1994 that produced an elasticity -1.31 for 
homicide.  In addition, the researchers conducted an additional analysis of national data from 
1948-1994 and found elasticities of -0.53 for assault and -2.57 for robbery.  Marvel and Moody 
controlled for inflation, population 15-17, population 18-24, population 25-34, population 35-44, 
percent non-white, personal income, unemployment, and welfare using decennial US Census 
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data.  In addition, the researchers controlled for the effect of World War II and the crack 
epidemic (Marvell & Moody, 1997).   
  Spelman (2000) looked at incarceration studies as a factor in the reduction of crime in 
the 1990s and found it to be a significant factor.   Using data from 1974 through 1997 and 
controlling for per capita income, unemployment, police per capita, and percentages of 
population that were black, ages 0-14, 15-17, 18-24, and 25-34,  he estimated a prisoner 
elasticity between .34 to .48.  While not entirely explaining the reduction in crime, he estimated 
that had the collective incarceration policies not existed, crime would have been 27% higher.  
Inversely, one fourth of crime reduction could be attributed to imprisonment (Spelman, 2000). 
State level studies were also conducted.  Marvell and Moody conducted a study of 49 
states from 1971-1989 for the effect of imprisonment on index crimes and found elasticities of    
-0.113 for forcible rape, -0.26 for robbery, -0.253 for burglary, -0.138 for larceny, and -0.200 for 
auto theft.  The researchers controlled for lagged crime and percent population in ages 15-17, 18-
24 and 25-35.  While the crime data came from the UCR and the prison data was obtained from 
BJS, the researchers did not indicate where the population data was obtained.  Marvel and 
Moody ultimately conclude that each additional state prisoner averted 17 index crimes with the 
majority of these 17 being larcenies (Marvell & Moody, 1994). 
Levitt conducted a study of 50 states and Washington, DC on imprisonment rates from 
1971-1993 on violent, property, and total index crimes.  Levitt controlled for police employees, 
GNP (contribution of each state), unemployment, percent black, percent living in metropolitan 
areas, and percent of age groups 0-14, 15-17, 18-24, and 25-34.  While police employees, GNP, 
and unemployment were taken from yearly data, the rest of the controls were interpolated from 
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decennial US Census data.  Levitt found elasticities of -0.38, -0.26, and -0.31 for violent, 
property and total index crimes respectively when additionally controlling for litigation status 
change resulting from court orders to reduce overcrowding (Levitt S. D., 1996).   
Besci also conducted a study of 50 states and Washington, DC from 1971-1989 (using 
similar data as Levitt) for the effect of imprisonment on violent, property and total index crimes.   
Besci controlled for police employees, police expenditures, unemployment, per capita income, 
public welfare, primary and secondary education, the number of convicts, population density, 
percent population 15-19, and percent population 20-24.  Besci found elasticities of -0.05, -0.09, 
and -0.09 for violent, property and total index crimes respectively (Besci, 1999).  Besci’s results 
are consistent with Marvell and Moody placing the elasticity of total index crime between -0.09 
to -0.16 (Besci, 1999).   
Comparing the results state analyses to national analyses reduces the elasticity by one 
tenth.  For every 1 percent change in a state’s prison population, the state could see a reduction in 
index crimes of 0.16% at best.  Based on national elasticity estimates, increasing the prison 
population by 100% would effectively eliminate crime.  The state elasticity figure would require 
a larger change in imprisonment.  Also to be noted is that the analyses all had difficulty finding 
accurate yearly data for social controls and, in most cases, interpolated data from decennial US 
Census data. 
3. Drugs 
 
 The nexus between drug abuse and crime was first suggested by Sutherland and Cressey 
in 1970 when they noticed that felons were over represented in the addict population (Sutherland 
& Cressey, 1970).  Gandossy et. al. proposed that drug users engaged in income producing crime 
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because addicts needed money to buy drugs (Gandossy, Williams, Cohen, & Harwood, 1980).  
Some scholars disagreed with this assumption and cited that many casual users existed and were 
not involved in crime (Robins, Davis, & Wish, 1980).  While studies have shown that there are 
heavy drug users that commit no crimes outside of drug possession (Collins, Rachal, Hubbard, 
Cavanaugh, Craddock, & Kristiansen, 1982) and there are heavy criminal recidivists that are not 
involved in drug use (Chaiken & Chaiken, 1985), the drug use-crime connection has still 
remained the dominant viewpoint. 
Johnson, Golub, and Dunlap (2000) examined the transition of the sub-culture of drug 
users in the City of New York and determined that the migration from crack cocaine to 
marijuana led to a reduction in violence.  They suggested that drug abuse went through four 
distinct phases: heroin, cocaine powder, crack cocaine, and marijuana.   As the culture 
progressed through heroin, cocaine, and crack, violence, specifically murders and robberies 
increased.  The particular distribution methods for the earlier drugs, and specifically crack, led to 
street violence.  A newer generation of drug abusers chose not to get involved in the violent 
transactions of crack cocaine and opted for marijuana.  The transition to marijuana led to less 
street violence specifically in regards to robbery, assault, domestic violence, and handgun 
possession (Johnson, Golub, Andrew, & Dunlap, 2000). 
Ousey and Augustine conducted an analysis of 109 cities in 1990 for the effect of 
concentrated disadvantage, racial inequality, and youth illicit drug market activity on firearm 
related homicides.  The researchers used gun related homicide offender rates for whites and 
blacks ages 14 to 17 for the dependent variable.  Concentrated disadvantage was measured by 
percent unemployed, percent below poverty line, percent that did not complete high school, 
percent female headed households, within race income dispersion, and concentration of 
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disadvantaged (the probability of drawing two poor people from the same from a given tract) 
derived from the 1990 US Census.  Racial inequality was measured by the ratio of white to black 
per capita income, white to black college graduates, black to white unemployment, and black to 
white residential segregation derived from the 1990 US Census.  Youth illicit drug market 
activity was measured by the juvenile arrest rate of for manufacturing, distributing, or selling cocaine 
or opiates for 1989 and 1990 from the Uniform Crime Report.  The study controlled for divorced males, 
cities located in the South and the West, and a few specific cities.  The researchers found partial support 
for concentrated disadvantage and juvenile drug market participation to gun related homicides for white 
juveniles only (Ousey & Augustine, 2001). 
Messner et. al. examined the effect of cocaine prevalence and misdemeanor arrests on the 
homicide rates of New York City from 1990 to 1999.  Data was obtained for 75 NYPD police 
precincts.  Misdemeanor arrests for each precinct were collected by year and divided by the 
population of the precinct from the 1990 US Census.  Cocaine prevalence was measured by the 
portion of accidental deaths that tested positive from post mortem toxicology analysis for 
cocaine.   Controls for percent male, percent black, percent female headed household, percent of 
population under public assistance, percent under 200% poverty level, percent persons with less 
than high school education,  and percent unemployed came from 1990 US Census figures.  In 
addition, three additional controls for firearms availability based off of the percentage of suicides 
committed with a gun, manpower based on total police officers assigned to precinct uncorrected 
for population, and felony arrests per 100,000 were also included.  The researchers found that 
change in misdemeanor arrests and cocaine prevalence had a significant, negative effect on 
homicides.  None of the controls proved significant (Messner, et al., 2007). 
The two quantitative studies involving drugs discussed above were performed at the 
county and within-city level.  Analysis of the drug-crime effect at the local level is important and 
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can provide valuable insight.  Both researchers used 1990 US Census data.  Messner used the 
1990 US Census data across all years of the study as a fixed variant.  Control variables in both 
studies did not provide any explanatory value. 
4. Guns 
 
The relationship of guns to crime has been a subject since the 1960s.  Researchers 
focused gun studies predominantly on murder and robbery.  The basic premise is that a gun gives 
the ability to rob or murder anyone despite differences in strength and size.  Studies focus on the 
availability of guns affecting crime, the effect of gun legislation (both restricting and allowing 
handgun permits), and the analysis of law enforcement programs aimed at reducing gun 
violence.   
Using data from 1976 and 1977 supplemental homicide reports submitted to the UCR, 
Cook determined that guns gave the ability to kill or rob relatively invulnerable victims.  
Invulnerability was based on the age difference between the victim and offender for murders and 
the victim gender/age and location (commercial, residence, street) for robbery (Cook, 1981). 
McDowall. Loftin, and Wiersema examined the effect of “shall issue” laws on homicides 
in large metropolitan areas in Florida, Mississippi, and Oregon from 1973 to 1992.  The time 
period provided for large time periods before and after the enactment of the new laws.  The 
researchers discovered that, overall, homicides increase 26% across the areas (McDowall, Loftin, 
& Wiersema, 1995). 
Wintemute conducted a study of guns and gun violence focusing specifically on murders 
in which he demonstrated that the peak in murders in 1993 directly correlated to the peak in 
pistol production in 1993.  Wintemute discussed all aspects of the gun violence debate from 
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characteristics of victims and offenders, laws designed to reduce gun violence and distribution, 
to interventions performed in certain cities.   He concluded that gun violence will decrease 
predominantly by focused law enforcement, increased sanctions for committing crime with guns, 
and more aggressive identification and prosecution procedures against dealers and manufacturers 
(Wintemute, 2000).   
Markios and Pratt conducted a meta-analysis of several studies to determine the 
effectiveness of different programs to reduce gun violence.  Specifically, the researchers divided 
the programs into three major categories: gun buy backs, gun laws, and law enforcement 
programs.  Markios and Pratt found a moderate impact (r=0.144) of all programs collectively.  
Gun buy back programs did not have a significant impact.  Gun laws that involved enhanced 
prison term, waiting periods, and gun bans were found to be significant.  Safe storage laws did 
not.  Law enforcement strategies that involved policing, probation, and community programs 
were found to have a small, but significant, impact.  Prosecution strategies did not (Markarios & 
Pratt, 2012). 
 Braga and others reviewed 1999 ATF firearm trace data and determined that illegal 
firearms come from a variety of sources such as licensed dealers, unlicensed sellers, theft from 
residences, dealers, common carriers, and manufacturers.   The researchers also determined that 
the typical criminal gun has a short time period from retail sale when comparing the average age 
of recovered firearms to the average age of firearms in the US.  Due to several methods available 
for criminals to obtain guns, the researchers recommend expanding gun trafficking indicators 
beyond serial numbers (Braga, Wintemute, Pierce, Cook, & Ridgeway, 2012). 
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 Gun studies demonstrate a connection between violence and guns, but applying an 
effective measure to determine availability of criminal guns is problematic.  Unlike measures of 
police as measured in police per 100,000 or prison elasticity which gives a reduction of crimes 
for a 1% increase in prison population, a standard measure for criminal gun availability has not 
been established.  This makes guns a difficult variable to include in a city level analysis.   
5. Economy 
 
Articles on economy and crime generally focus on the relationship between 
unemployment and other indicators.  Researchers generally focus on murders and crimes that are 
related to monetary gain.   Generally, UCR data was used as the estimate for crime, but some 
studies used youth survey data. 
Parker and Horowitz conducted a study of the effect of unemployment on both crime and 
imprisonment using data from 1975-1980.  Unemployment was obtained using national figures 
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  Crime was obtained from the UCR and total prisoner 
population, admissions, and releases were obtained from the Department of Justice.  They did 
not find any significance between unemployment and crime and unemployment and 
imprisonment (Parker & Horwitz, 1986). 
Votey examined data collected by the Vera Institute of Justice for 152 Brooklyn arrestees 
in 1979 for the effect of employment on crime taking into account deterrence, age, and race.  The 
survey involved two interviews to get employment and economic data from the arrestees: the 
time of arrest and a follow-up survey conducted a year later.  Votey determined that previous 
contacts with the police led to desistance from crime, prior work experience and economic 
opportunity led to desistance from crime, and when controlled for these effects and educational 
attainment, there was no difference in recidivism between blacks and whites (Votey Jr., 1991). 
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Britt examined the effects of unemployment and age on crime using national age specific 
arrest rates for murder, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny, and auto theft from 
1958-1995 as reported in the UCR.  Age groups 16-17, 18-19, 20-24, 25-34, and 35-44 were 
used.  Age specific unemployment was obtained from the Department of Labor.  Britt found that 
unemployment has a greater effect on property crimes with youth and young adults (ages 16-24) 
and the unemployment-crime relationship varied over time in a nonsystematic way (Britt, 1997). 
Grogger (2000) created an economic labor-market model in an attempt to explain 
violence that occurred in the early 1990s.  Basically, market wages factored into the utility 
decision youths made when deciding to engage in crime.  He specifically linked it to the crack 
cocaine trade of the late 1980s and early 1990s.  Using youth surveys, Grogger found a 
correlation between youth involvement in crime and hourly wages.  As wages went up in 1993, 
fewer youth engaged in violent crime.  Grogger also related the cost of violence in the utility 
decision and inferred that youths evaluated the potential risk of violence and the potential income 
together and most determined to look for alternative legitimate means to maximize their utility 
(Grogger, 2000). 
Rosenfeld examined the effect of economic conditions on felony homicides, argument-
related homicides, and acquisitive crimes from 1970-2006 for four regions of the US: Northeast, 
Midwest, South, and West.  Felony homicides included murders associated with robbery, 
burglary, automobile theft, other serious felonies, gambling, drug, and commercialized vice 
offenses.  Argument-related homicides included killings associated with alcohol and drug related 
fights and other arguments.  Acquisitive crime included robbery, burglary, and auto theft.  
Economic conditions were measured by unemployment, GDP per capita, and the Index of 
Consumer Sentiment.  Rosenfeld controlled for police officers per 100,000 from the UCR and 
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state prisoners per 100,000 from BJS.  Additionally, percent population between the ages of 15-
24 and percent population black from the US Census were also controlled for, but the specific 
source of the data was not listed.   Rosenfeld found a significant effect between economic 
conditions and acquisitive crime and a significant effect between acquisitive crime and felony 
related homicide (Rosenfeld R. , 2009). 
Lauritsen and Heimer analyzed NCVS data from 1975 to 2005 for the effect of economic 
downturns on non-fatal violent victimization on Latino, non-Latino Black, and non-Latino White 
males.  Non-fatal violent victimizations were robberies and aggravated assaults as self-reported 
by the victims in the NCVS.  Economic conditions were measured by the Index of Consumer 
Sentiment maintained by the University of Michigan.  The researchers found that rates of 
violence declined for all groups, Latinos and non-Latino Blacks experienced increased violence 
with downturns in the economy, and this increased violence was due to robberies and assaults 
from strangers (Lauritsen & Heimer, 2010). 
With the exception of Parker and Horowitz, the studies found some effect of economic 
conditions on crime.   Both violent crimes and property crimes were found to have some 
relationship to economic conditions.  Most of the researchers struggled with population controls 
and made estimates on decennial data or neglected to mention the method of obtaining yearly 
data.  Also, with the exception of Votey, all of the studies were performed on a national or 
regional level. 
6. COMPSTAT 
 
Since several references refer to reduction of crime through the implementation of 
COMPSTAT, a further literature review was conducted specifically on it.  (COMPSTAT is an 
abbreviation for computer statistics.)  After a brief introduction and review of literature, 
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COMPSTAT will be considered in the model as best indicated by QOL Enforcement.  Most of 
the articles associate COMPSTAT with QOL Enforcement or consider COMPSTAT as QOL 
Enforcement.  
In 1994, the New York City Police Department (NYPD) started rapid changes in its 
management style, culture, and methods for addressing crime through the use of a monitoring 
tool called COMPSTAT.  Through this new implementation, crime trends were carefully 
examined and tactics were developed to reduce or stop poor (increasing) trends in crime.  
COMPSTAT identified crime prone locations and high risk offenders and created strategies on 
how to remove or reduce them.  As Jack Maples suggested, one must “put cops on dots.” (Maple 
& Mitchell, 1999).   Through this strategic placement, crime prone areas became low crime areas 
or were completely crime free. 
COMPSTAT is a management model initially adopted by the NYPD to analyze crime, 
develop tactical and strategic solutions, and follow up with assessment of the tactics and how 
effectively personnel assigned to the tasks performed.  Analysis of recent crime trends provide 
for a planned response of personnel and resources.  The response is generally assigned to a 
Precinct Commander who is responsible for implementation and coordination of all resources.  
The response is assessed to determine effectiveness, continuation of the tactic, or abandonment 
(Weisburd, Mastrofski, McNally, Greenspan, & Willis, 2003).  The COMPSTAT process is 
founded on four principles listed below: (see (McDonald, 2002), (Shane, 2007), (Godwon, 
2009)) 
 Accurate and timely intelligence (i.e., “Know what is happening.” (Godwon, 
2009)) 
 Effective tactics (i.e., “Have a plan.” (Godwon, 2009)). 
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 Rapid deployment (i.e., “Do it quickly.” (Godwon, 2009)). 
 Relentless follow-up and assessment (i.e., “If it works, do more. If not, do 
something else.” (Godwon, 2009)  
This basis for the COMPSTAT model has continued in New York to present day and has been 
adopted by other cities. 
Andrew Karmen (2000), in his book, The New York Murder Mystery: The True Story 
about the Crime Crash of the 1990’s, suggests that COMPSTAT had little to do with the 
decreased crime rate of the 1990s and was related to a good economy and increased incarceration 
within New York State due to sentencing changes in the late 1980s.  While the book made for 
strong arguments and looked at several factors such as number of police, Police Presence in 
public areas, response times, better clearance rates, Quality of Life enforcement, sentencing 
enhancements, changes in drug use behavior, demographics, and the economy, Karmen doesn't 
analyze the factors together in a model that allows for interactions and controls (Karmen, 2000). 
Articles about COMPSTAT fall into three categories: surveys of police officers and 
executives about their feelings with regard to the application of COMPSTAT, comparisons of 
similar but different programs to COMPSTAT, and anti-COMPSTAT critiques.  Vito et. al.’s 
(2005) COMPSTAT: the Managers’ Perspective is a classic example of the first category.  
Literature about COMPSTAT and a survey were given to a group of police managers and the 
results were analyzed quantitatively and qualitatively.  Conclusions were then made from very 
small sample sizes.  In this case, 47 managers were surveyed giving mixed results of the 
effectiveness of the program (Vito, Walsh, & Kunselman, 2005).   
The second category is best demonstrated by Rosenfeld, Fornago, and Baumer’s (2005) 
comparison of the effectiveness of three different programs utilizing a Hierarchical General 
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Linear Model, using pre and post interventions to predict murders.  The researchers used police 
per capita, prevalence of cocaine use, and state incarceration rate in the first step of their models.  
Population density and resource deprivation are introduced in their second step.  They found no 
evidence to support that Ceasefire and COMPSTAT had any significant effect on the murder rate 
of their respective cities when the second step of the model was introduced.  Only Richmond’s 
Exile, a program that placed sentence enhancements for violent crimes with firearms through 
federal prosecution, was found to be effective.  The researchers used a ten-year period with 
uneven pre-intervention and post-intervention times.  For New York, the researchers use a pre-
intervention period from 1992-1993 compared to the post-intervention period of 1994-2001.  The 
two year to ten year period comparison was problematic (Rosenfeld, Fornago, & Baumer, 2005). 
Eli Silverman (2006) argued in COMPSTAT’s Innovation that COMPSTAT was effective 
in reducing crime through its inclusion of organizational change and management restructuring 
(Silverman, 2006). The article took a typical pro-COMPSTAT position.  Equally supportive is 
Weisburd, Mastrofski, Willis & Greenspan (2006), in Changing Everything So That Everything 
Can Remain The Same:  COMPSTAT and American Policing, who suggest that COMPSTAT is 
the old concept of problem oriented policing developed by Goldstein years earlier and properly 
deployed (Weisburg, Mastrofski, Willis, & Greenspan, 2006). 
Kelling and Sousa (2001) used a Hierarchical General Linear Model to evaluate the effect 
of COMPSTAT in New York.  The article used the NYPD’s 76 police precincts as separate cases 
and tested for changes in unemployment, age composition, drug prevalence, and misdemeanor 
arrests on violent crime.  COMPSTAT was measured by misdemeanor arrests (Kelling & Sousa, 
2001).  While not controlling for other aspects believed to be associated with crime, such as 
Andrew Costello 
22 
 
poverty and immigration trends, this was the most robust study on Quality of Life 
Enforcement/”Broken Windows” Theory in practice.   
The most important contribution from the Kelling and Sousa article is that they found an 
effective measure for the application of COMPSTAT in the use of misdemeanor arrests.  The use 
of all misdemeanor arrests is not necessarily an effective measure for COMPSTAT application; 
however, a subset of misdemeanor arrests directly associated with QOL offenses would be a 
more accurate representation of COMPSTAT application – the delta/change in QOL offenses pre 
and post COMPSTAT may be the most accurate measure – although determining that number 
may be difficult.  While the author does not agree on using all misdemeanor arrests for the effect 
of COMPSTAT, a subset of misdemeanor arrests that are directly associated with Quality of Life 
offenses should lead to an effective measure of COMPSTAT.    
While this abbreviated review of literature addressed the central themes of books and 
articles about COMPSTAT, it is far from exhaustive.  Writings from the Southern Police 
Institute and the National Institute of Justice alone are voluminous; however, only Kelling (2001) 
and Rosenfeld (2005) have directly addressed crime rates with empirically valid statistical 
models.  The majority of work is anecdotal or rhetorical. 
7. Summary of Literature 
 
The literature review presented differing results for the impacts by police, imprisonment, 
drugs, guns, the economy, and COMPSTAT.  Studies both supported and refuted these effects.  
The lack of adequate controls for economic indicators, incarceration, and demographics at the 
city level prevailed throughout all of the city level studies.  Most studies were conducted at the 
national or state level.  The studies involving cities had improper controls for demographic, 
economic, and imprisonment data based on the unit of analysis or time period.  The lack of city 
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level studies demonstrates a need for analyses at this level.  Only at the city level can effective 
policies be implemented and managed.  Managing programs at state and national levels for 
criminal incidents that are local is difficult to impossible. 
C.  Theoretical Background 
1. Deterrence 
a) Classic Foundation of Deterrence Theory 
 
The earliest concept of deterrence theory began with the early works of Cesare Beccaria   
with his 1764 work On Crime and Punishment, which critiqued the current administration of 
criminal law and laid out the principles of deterrence theory.  The fundamental concept is that 
people are rational, their behavior is produced by free will, in which the goal is to seek pleasure 
and/or reduce pain.  Therefore, laws should be created that specify the undesirable activity to be 
prevented and have an appropriate penalty that will likely prevent a rational person from 
committing the activity.  This is the foundation of classical deterrence theory (Brown, Ensensen, 
& Gies, 2001). 
Beccaria also expands the concept of deterrence by defining the three principles of 
punishment: certainty, celerity, and severity.  Certainty refers to the probability of being caught 
by the authorities for committing a criminal act.  Celerity is the speed in which an offender is 
punished.  Severity is the application level of pain for the offense.  Beccaria posited that severity 
was not nearly as important as certainty or celerity (Traub & Little, 1999). 
Jeremy Bentham slightly adjusted the classical view by introducing utilitarian influences 
into the rationalization of punishment.  Bentham proposed that punishment should not be 
motivated by retribution, but merely the desire to prevent crime.  The utilitarianism thought also 
affected the concept of the definition of criminal laws.  Under Bentham's greater happiness 
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principle, actions are evaluated on whether they contribute to the benefit of humankind.  
Criminal acts are those behaviors that detract from the common benefit of humankind and, 
therefore, must be prevented.  Since Bentham believed that people weigh the costs and benefits 
of their actions, legal systems can create appropriate laws and punishments for them that would 
deter criminal behavior (Walsh & Ellis, 2007). 
b) Modifications to Deterrence Theory 
 
Deterrence theory remained relatively unchanged throughout 19
th
 century and started to 
have modifications and extensions in the latter half of the 20
th
 century.  Becker integrated 
economic and utility ideas in to the criminal decision making process (Becker, 1968).  Adenaes 
discussed how sanction threats and sentences worked across different types of offenders and 
offenses (Andenaes, 1974).  Cornish and Clark, placing aspects of rational choice perspective 
based on situations, focused on risk/reward decisions based on specific crimes at specific 
locations.  Focusing on specific crimes was perceived by Cornish and Clark to be more amenable 
to action than a high level non-specific sanction plan (Cornish & Clark, 1986).  Katz further 
modified deterrence theory with the inclusion of emotional and mental benefits that may be more 
difficult to deter through traditional sanctions (Katz J. , 1988).  Stafford and Warr add the 
concept of personal and vicarious experiences in perceptions of punishment in calculating the 
decision to commit crime (Stafford & Warr, 1993).  David Kennedy, in 2009, takes a fresh look 
at the old concept of deterrence and provides convincing arguments that deterrence works. He 
further explains, while the human calculus is complicated, sanctions are interpreted by most 
offenders and they do affect behavior (Kennedy, 2009).  With slight modification, deterrence 
theory has remained stable since its start. 
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c) Modern Application of Deterrence Theory 
 
Several studies have focused on the efficacy of arrest as a deterrent to future domestic 
violence incidents in the latter quarter of the 20
th
 century.  Initiated with the Minneapolis 
Domestic Violence Experiment, Sherman and Berk determined that arrests were more effective 
in preventing future domestic violence between domestic partners over mediation or separation 
of the offender (Sherman & Berk, 1984).  Berk and Newton replicate the same finding in 
California (Berk & Newton, 1985).  Hirschel and Hutchinson found no difference in arrests, 
issuance of a summons, or separation in Charlotte when they did follow up interviews of victims 
and review of police records (Hirschel & Hutchinson, 1992).  Dunford, Huizinga, and Elliott 
came to the same conclusion in Omaha, Nebraska finding that arrests were not superior to 
citation or separation (Dunford, Huizinga, & Elliott, 1992).  Sherman conducts another 
replication study in Milwaukee, Wisconsin demonstrating that arrest was more effective in 
preventing spouse assault recidivism than other police responses (Sherman, Schmidt, Rogan, 
Smith, & Gartin, 1992).  Pate and Hamilton, in Dade County, Florida, found that arrests did have 
a deterrent effect on spouse abuse recidivism when offenders were employed, but produced 
worse results when offenders were unemployed (Pate & Hamilton, 1992).  In summary, initial 
studies demonstrated benefit to arrest as an intervention to spouse abuse recidivism, but later 
studies determined that arrest as an intervention was only effective when the arrestee had some 
stake in the community where the threat of arrest would have some impact. 
Researchers have also analyzed perceived sanction risks of offenders based on direct and 
vicarious experiences of high school students, college students, and convicts.  Bridges and Stone, 
out of a sample of 550 federal convicts, found inexperienced offenders to have a greater risk 
perception from punishment, but no effect on veteran criminals (Bridges & Stone, 1986).   
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Horney and Marshall performed a study on 1,000 convicted felons and found that convicts with 
greater arrest to self-reported incidents had higher risk perceptions in being caught (Horney & 
Marshall, 1992).  Lochner, using National Youth Survey (NYS) data, determined that actual 
arrests increased the perception of likeliness of arrest (Lochner, 2003).  Pogarsky, Piquero, and 
Paternoster examined a sample of high school students and found that students were more 
affected by the experiences of their peers than their own direct experiences (Pogarsky, Piquero, 
& Paternoster, 2004). 
2. Expected Utility Theory 
 
Expected utility theory is an expansion of rational choice theory to account for 
differences in decisions made by individuals in similar circumstances.  Starting with a foundation 
of rational choice theory best explained by Cornish and Clark defining crime as a purposeful 
behavior of some individuals to gain commonplace needs such as money, sex, or status.  These 
individuals make rational choices based on available information to determine the risk associated 
with being caught committing the crime versus the gain from committing it.  To prevent crime, 
punishment severity, swiftness, and likelihood of apprehension need to be created to affect the 
individual’s risk making decision (Cornish & Clark, 1986).  Expected utility theory expands on 
rational choice theory by accounting for different utility for the same value and is influenced by 
economists. 
Expected utility theory starts on a foundation from Daniel Bernoulli in which he defines 
price versus utility.  Price was defined by Bernoulli as being the intrinsic value of an object.  
Utility is dependent on the circumstances of the individual.  For example, an item that is a $1,000 
will have the same price for both a poor person and a rich person.  The item will have a greater 
utility for a poor person than a rich person (Bernoulli, 1954).  The poor man, seeing greater 
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utility in the $1,000 item might take greater risk to take the object than a rich man who will have 
less utility for the item.  Utility is a greater factor in risk decisions than price. 
Neumann and Morgenstein further expand the concept of risk and utility in the 
introduction of their game theory.  Within their game theory, they developed an expected utility 
function.  Although applied to lotteries, the expected utility function provides excellent rationale 
on decision making.  The expected utility function has five preference axioms: completeness, 
transitivity, continuity, monotonicty, and substitution.   Completeness specifies that an 
individual, when presented with two outcomes, either prefers one outcome over another or is 
indifferent to either outcome.  Transitivity means that if an individual prefers outcome one to 
outcome two and outcome two to outcome three, this individual prefers outcome one to outcome 
three.  Continuity means that the upper and lower outcomes for a preference set are closed.  
Monotonicity stipulates that an individual will prefer an outcome with a better probability of 
success over an outcome with a poorer probability of success.  Substitution specifies that if an 
individual is indifferent to two outcomes, then preferences with the same probability can be 
switched.  Individuals will choose an action based on which outcome will produce the greatest 
expected utility (Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1953). 
Arrow and Pratt expand expected utility theory to determine a measure of risk aversion.  
Risk aversion takes into account separate behaviors of decision makers when deciding on 
preferences for outcomes.  Decision makers fall into six groups of behavior that fall into two 
main categories: absolute and relative.  Absolute Risk Aversion (ARA) is based on absolute 
value of assets and describes three behaviors:  those who hold fewer dollars in risk as wealth 
increases, those who hold the same dollar amount in risk as wealth increases, and those place 
more dollars in risk as wealth increases.  Relative Risk Aversion is similar to ARA, but is a 
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relative percentage of wealth describing three behaviors: those who hold smaller percentage in 
risk as wealth increases, those who hold the same percentage in risk as wealth increases, and 
those hold greater percentage in risk as wealth increases (Arrow, 1965) (Pratt, 1964).      
Kahneman and Tversky further expand expected utility theory with their prospect theory.  
Through experiment, Kahneman and Tversky determined that people underweight outcomes that 
are merely probable to certain outcomes and overweight outcomes that have low probabilities.  
For example, most individuals would choose receiving a definite $450 than having a 50% chance 
of receiving $1000.  A logical individual who knows he will be exposed to several of these same 
decisions should opt for the gamble, for in the long run, the collective gambles will return $500 
times the number of gambles.  When the probability for success is low, the risk decision behavior 
changed.  Individuals were more likely to decide to take a risk of winning $6,000 with a 
probability of 0.001 versus $3,000 with a probability of 0.002 (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). 
Expected utility theory is a considerable improvement on rational choice theory and 
explains differences in individuals in their decision making process.  While the primary focus of 
expected utility theory was decision making of financial preferences, its application to 
criminology is useful.  Expected utility theory better explains what some scholars feel are 
shortcomings in rational choice theory by explaining what may appear to be irrational.  
Individuals not only take the gain of committing a crime into account when making the risk 
decision, but also the probability of getting caught.  The explanations of three different actors on 
deciding to steal a cell phone can be explained under expected utility theory.  Assuming the 
probability of getting caught is the same for all actors, a poor person might see greater utility in 
the $300 resale of the phone, one rich person may have never changed his risk level for theft, and 
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another rich person does not see the same utility in the gain of $300 when he was when he was 
poorer. 
Expected utility theory is affected by both Police Presence and QOL Enforcement.  
Police Presence, with its increase in likelihood of apprehension, decreases the probability of 
successfully committing a crime, thus lowering the expected utility of the outcome.  QOL 
Enforcement should also affect probability of success by placing enforcement efforts in crime 
prone locations.  Areas were individuals would go to have a greater probability of success in 
committing crimes would be disrupted by QOL Enforcement.  Also, the probability of 
successfully committing lower level crimes would decrease under QOL Enforcement lowering 
the expected utility. 
 
3. Routine Activity 
a) Foundation of Routine Activity Theory 
 
Cohen and Felson introduced Routine Activity Theory in 1979.  Its primary tenants state 
that in order for a crime to occur, there must be a motivated offender, a target must be available, 
and there is a lack of capable guardian.  If any of the three factors are missing, a crime will not 
occur.  A motivated offender is self-explanatory.  Targets are defined to be people or objects.  
Capable guardians are considered to be police, people, or technology such as closed circuit 
televisions (Cohen & Felson, 1979). 
Cohen and Felson further expand the theory into sub-components for the target using the 
terms: value, inertia, visibility, and accessibility.   The target must have some value as perceived 
by the offender.  Inertia refers to the size of the target and its potential to be easily removed if the 
target is an object. Visibility refers to the ability for the offender to see the target.  Accessibility 
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refers to the ability of the offender to not only access the target, but be able to retreat or escape 
(Cohen & Felson, 1979).  Cohen, Kluegel, and Land expand the theory to include five mediating 
roles: exposure, guardianship, proximity to potential offenders, attractiveness of potential targets, 
and definitional properties of specific crimes.  Definitional properties of specific crimes were 
defined as aspects of certain crimes that make target attractiveness less apparent.  For example, a 
burglar does not have specific knowledge of the contents of a house as easily as a petty thief 
directly seeing an object and taking it.  These new factors placed a new emphasis on victim 
behavior (Cohen, Kluegel, & Land, 1981). 
b) Modifications to Routine Activity Theory 
 
Osgood and others presented a routine activity theory of general deviance to explain a 
broader range of deviance than direct personal crimes.  They present a concept that social contact 
within groups unsupervised by a competent guardian is the major contributor to general 
deviance.  For example, unsupervised youth groups may experiment with drugs or conspire to 
rob somebody.  The authors test the theory using a five wave longitudinal study of 18 to 26 year 
olds.  Based on self-reports of the study group, criminal behavior, as observed by drug abuse, 
alcohol abuse, and dangerous driving, was associated with going to parties, informal gatherings 
with peers, unsupervised car rides, and unsupervised evening recreational activities  (Osgood, 
Wilson, O'Malley, Bachman, & Johnston, 1996).      
Clarke, in 1999, reinterprets Routine Activity Theory by modifying Value, Inertia, 
Visibility and Accessibility subcomponents (VIVA) of the target and expanding it to CRAVED.  
This is an acronym for Concealable, Removable, Available, Valuable, Enjoyable, and 
Disposable.  Clarke believed that this expansion removes the previous limitations of Routine 
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Activity Theory by accounting for all targets of predatory crime, specific motives of theft, and 
ease of certain targets that are more concealable and disposable (Clarke, 1999). 
c) Modern Application of Routine Activity Theory 
 
Routine activities theory has been tested on aggregate crime rates, property victimization, 
personal victimization, and violent crimes.  When Clarke et. al. expanded routine activity theory 
in 1981, they conducted a study using data from the LEAA National Crime Survey and 
determined that income, race, and age that are indicative of proximity, guardianship, and 
exposure are related to incidents of assault, burglary, and personal larceny (Cohen, Kluegel, & 
Land, 1981).  Miethe, Stafford, and Long found that males, low income persons, the unmarried, 
and the young were more likely to have violent crime experiences and households headed by 
persons who are male, black, unmarried, young, and have relatively high income are more likely 
to be victims of property crimes.  These groups were more likely to be either targets of crime, 
lack guardianship, and had greater exposure to criminals than others (Miethe, Stafford, & Long, 
1987).  Stahura and Sloan analyzed 676 US suburbs for the effect of criminal motivation, 
criminal opportunity, and guardianship on personal and property crimes and found significant 
direct and indirect results for all effects (Stahura & Sloan, 1988).  Fisher, Sloan, Cullen, and 
Chenmeng examined victimization rates of 3,472 students and determined that property 
victimization was increased by proximity to crime, target attractiveness, exposure, and lack of 
guardianship.  Personal victimization of the students was associated to high levels of partying (at 
night) and recreational drug use (Fisher, Sloan, Cullen, & Lu, 1998).  
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4. “Broken Windows” – A Construct 
a) The Emergence of “Broken Windows” 
 
Published in the March 1982 Atlantic Monthly by George L. Kelling and James Q. 
Wilson, the article “Broken Windows” re-introduced an old concept of directed foot patrol in 
troublesome areas to establish order.  The concept of “Broken Windows” is that disorder starts 
with one broken window in a building.  If the broken window is not repaired, other windows will 
soon be broken resulting in all of the windows in a building being destroyed.  This disorder 
fosters a level of acceptance of deviant behavior for people living in the community including 
those that are normally law abiding citizens.  Once smaller deviant behavior is tolerated, people 
will feel comfortable committing more serious criminal acts (Kelling & Wilson, 1982). 
To prevent or stop the downward spiral of social decay in the form of criminality, efforts 
should be placed to remove areas where people feel comfortable or are tolerant of crime.  The 
preferred method of the authors to change these areas into orderly environments is QOL 
Enforcement. QOL Enforcement focuses on acts that are committed in public view such as 
disorderly conduct, drunkenness, prostitution, street gambling, street drug dealing, vagrancy, and 
loitering (Kelling & Wilson, 1982). 
“Broken Windows” directly explains the need to analyze QOL Enforcement in the 
reduction of crime.  In particular, the New York City Police Department actively engaged in 
quality of life enforcement as a result of the article with the intent to reduce the “seven major” 
crimes.  (The “seven majors” are similar to Part I Index Crimes under the Uniform Crime Report 
(UCR).  Specifically, they are murder, rape, robbery, felonious assault, burglary, grand larceny, 
and grand larceny of automobile.  It is the major measurement tool used to evaluate precinct 
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commander performance.)  “Broken Windows” indirectly implies a need for Police Presence 
which can be related to increased number of police officers (Bratton & Knobler, 1998). 
b) Modern Application of “Broken Windows” 
 
The most recent empirical study in New York City for the effect of broken windows was 
written by Corman and Mocan.  Corman and Mocan examine economic and enforcement efforts 
on Part I crime in New York City from 1974-1999 and found that broken windows enforcement, 
as measured by misdemeanor arrests, had validity in reduction of robbery, grand larceny, and 
automobile theft (Corman & Mocan, 2005).   
Several studies have been conducted on broken windows enforcement outside of New 
York City.  Katz, Webb, and Schaefer reviewed the QOL initiative in Chandler, Arizona for 
effect on a variety of calls for service and found significant effects in reducing calls for public 
morals and physical disorder (Katz, Webb, & Schaefer, 2001).  Jang, Hoover, and Lawton 
reviewed 35 Texas cities for the effect of broken windows enforcement on Part I clearance rates 
and found a significant increase for burglary clearances, a marginal increase on automobile theft 
clearance, and decrease in larceny clearances associated with broken windows enforcement 
(Jang, Hoover, & Lawton, Effect of broken windows enforcement on clearance rates, 2008).   
Jang, Hoover, and Joo looked at broken windows policing in Fort Worth, Texas and found 
significant decreases in property and total index crime rates when controlling for other rival 
factors, but no association with violent crime rates (Jang, Hoover, & Joo, 2010).  
This brief review of deterrence theory, rational choice theory, and broken windows is 
limited, but highlights the major parts of the theories and studies that have affirmed them.  This 
is not to suggest that there are studies that do not validate the theories.  Deterrence theory, with 
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its focus on certainty, celerity, and severity, focuses on punishment and the likelihood of 
apprehension.  Routine activities theory, with its primary tenets of a motivated offender, a target, 
and lack of a capable guardian focuses more on prevention than punishment or apprehension.  
Broken windows combines aspects of both deterrence theory and rational choice theory.  The 
certainty, celerity, and severity of QOL Enforcement must be strongly administered by capable 
guardians to prevent motivated offenders from considering preying on targets and prevent targets 
from engaging in behavior that places them more at risk. 
  
 Reduction in Crime 1990-2009 
35 
 
III. Hypotheses 
 
The focus of this study is the effect of policing on observable crime.  The study will test 
the effect of Police Presence and QOL Enforcement on observable crime.  Therefore the 
hypotheses presented will directly test their effect and if there is an interactive effect.  The null 
hypothesis is presented first.  With hypothesis testing, the null hypothesis must be disproven. 
 
RH0: Police Presence and QOL Enforcement did not contribute to the reduction of observable 
crime from 1980-2009. 
  
H1: Police Presence had a significant impact on the reduction of observable crime from 1980-
2009. 
A preferred answer by most politicians, this hypothesis assumes that 
there is a negative correlation between the number of crimes and the 
number of police officers.   
Applicable Theories:  
Deterrence - By placing more officers, the likelihood of 
apprehension should increase. 
Routine Activity - The more police officers that exists, the more 
capable guardians are present to prevent crime. 
Expected Utility – Increases in police staffing will increase the 
possibility of apprehension and decrease the probability of success, 
therefore lowering the expected utility. 
Broken Windows – Larger Police Presence will allow for greater 
placement of police officers in more disorderly areas therefor 
disrupting crime prone areas. 
H2: QOL Enforcement had a significant impact on the reduction of observable crime from 1980-
2009. 
Another preferred answer by some law enforcement practitioners, 
the enforcement of low level crimes set a tone to offenders that 
more serious crimes would not be tolerated.  Assuming violations, 
infractions, and misdemeanors are enforced, fewer felonies should 
occur.  This explanation also involves the application of 
COMPSTAT.  COMPSTAT and drug enforcement can be measured 
by the enforcement of QOL offenses. 
Applicable Theories:  
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Deterrence - By enforcing low level crimes, offenders may fear a 
greater likelihood of capture.  
Expected Utility – Decreasing the probability of success of low 
level crimes and observable crimes by police presence in high crime 
areas will reduce the expected utility of these acts. 
Broken Windows - By enforcing low level crimes, people will feel 
uncomfortable or become intolerant of serious crime.  
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IV. Methodology 
A. Population and Sampling 
 
Prior to analysis, an a priori strength analysis was performed to determine the sample size 
needed to provide an anticipated effect size of 0.15 with a desired power level of 0.95 and to a 
significance probability level of 0.05 for 2 variables.  This analysis determined a minimum 
sample size of 106 would be necessary.  This would require a sample of 4 cities for a period of 
30 years to obtain the necessary minimum sample size.  The cities with the largest populations in 
2009 were New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, and Houston respectively.  To be more inclusive 
and provide for greater reliability of power, effect size, and probability, the sample was 
expanded to all cities with a population greater than 950,000 as reported to the UCR as the 
populations of the police agencies’ jurisdiction were selected with the intent to collect data 
spanning for 30 years.  These twelve cities are listed below:  
 Phoenix, Arizona 
 Los Angeles, California 
 San Diego, California 
 San Jose, California 
 Honolulu, Hawaii 
 Chicago, Illinois 
 New York, New York 
 Las Vegas, Nevada 
 Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 
 Dallas, Texas 
 Houston, Texas 
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 San Antonio, Texas 
With a target of 360 data points, the dataset was large enough to prevent potential 
problems with strength and validity.  These cities were also large enough to have data available 
at local levels and more likely to have consistent reporting due to larger bureaucratic structures 
that smaller cities might not have.  Larger cities have larger crime numbers and their yearly rates 
are not as easily swayed by spikes in crime as smaller cities.  In 1991, the largest recorded year 
for crime, this convenience sample of 12 cities accounted for 15% of national Part I crimes in 
1991. 
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B. The Dependent Variable – Observable Crime 
 
To determine the observable crime, an index was created with a subset of the Uniform 
Crime Report (UCR) Part I crimes that were likely to be observable to the police and likely to be 
affected by QOL Enforcement.  Mainly, the crimes were committed in public view.  Murders 
were excluded from the observable crime index after reviewing expanded homicide data and 
determining that strangers accounted for 12% of all murders.  Forcible Rape was also removed 
under the same reasoning when it was determined that strangers accounted for 16%.  Robbery 
was included but modified when determined that 66% of robberies were in public view.  
Aggravated assaults were excluded from the observable crime index when determined that the 
majority of aggravated assaults were committed by acquaintances and intimates.    Larceny Theft 
was modified to include the 41% of larcenies that were potentially observable and preventable by 
the police.  Auto theft was excluded because no determination of the portion of what was 
observable or preventable could be determined (Federal Bureau of Investigations, 2012).   
The observable crime index was created multiplying the yearly reported robbery crimes 
of each city by 66% and the yearly reported larceny-theft crimes by 41%.  The two crimes were 
then summed and divided by the population of the city for the specific year as reported by the 
police agency of the city.  The index was then multiplied by 100,000 to produce a standard 
comparable rate of crimes per 100,000 residents.  All crime data and population data was 
obtained from the Uniform Crime Report for reporting years 1980-2009. 
UCR data was chosen over data from the National Incident based reporting System 
(NIBRS) and the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) due to limitations in both 
datasets.  While there are criticisms of both UCR and NCVS data, since this focus is in police, 
UCR data is superior (Jacob, 1984, p. 22).  None of the cities in the sample participate in NIBRS 
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(Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2011).  While the NCVS produces a valid national figure for 
incidents of crime, the NVCS does not collect enough data within cities to produce city level 
figures with any reliability (Bureau of justice Statistics, 2012).  Even if the entire NCVS sample 
was conducted in New York City, the sample would only represent 1.2% of the population of the 
City of New York.    
C. Independent Variables 
1. Police Presence 
 
Deterrence theory, routine activities theory and “Broken Windows” benefit from Police 
Presence.  Police Presence fits into deterrence theory by providing a recognizable force whose 
mission is to deter crime by uniformed patrol and investigation.  Police Presence, through 
apprehension efforts, should provide certainty of prosecution.  The appearance of a uniformed 
patrol officer should deter crimes in the immediate area and give some celerity of apprehension 
in the same immediate area.  Police Presence is also the capable guardian of Routine Activities 
Theory.  The uniformed presence of a police officer should discourage the motivated offender 
and police officer may harden targets that appear to be soft.  Focusing on violations needed for 
“Broken Windows” needs police officers.  Police Presence is helpful for all three theories.  
The four predominate methods of measuring Police Presence are total number of sworn 
officers, police officers per capita, total personnel within police agency, and total police 
expenditures.  The NYPD has an additional measurement called Daily on Patrol Strength.   Each 
has their strengths and shortcomings.  After a brief discussion of each method, justification for 
the police officer per capita will be presented as the best measurement for Police Presence due to 
the need of having a consistent measure for the entire time frame being examined.   
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Each year on October 31, for those agencies that participate in the Uniform Crime 
Report, a snapshot of the total number of sworn personnel is taken.  While there are fluctuations 
in the number of sworn personnel within an agency due to hiring and attrition through 
retirements and other terminations, most agencies have relatively stable hiring practices within 
any given year.  A given snapshot on October 31 should be reflective of average headcount of 
police officers in the same year.  Sworn officers also reflect the direct law enforcement presence 
in the city. 
Police officer per capita is another common measure of Police Presence.  This measure 
balances disparities of using pure headcount by taking into account population.  The UCR 
publishes police officers per capita data and displays the figure by number of police officers per 
100,000 residents.  This measure is effective when comparing across cities of different 
populations and is also effective of demonstrating increased or decreased presence in cities with 
changing populations.  Unfortunately, this measure relies on population estimates provided by 
the reporting agency.  It does not adequately reflect cities that may have difficulty estimating 
populations due to large fluctuations between census surveys, considerable illegal immigrant 
populations, or large commuter populations.  All of which can vary between years based on 
economic conditions.  This places some concern in the use of police officers per capita 
comparison. 
 Total number of personnel, both sworn and not sworn, is another measure of law 
enforcement effort.  This concept takes into account the extremely valuable contributions that 
“civilian” staff, such as radio dispatchers, telephone operators, laboratory personnel, 
administrative staff, staff attorneys, and analysts, contribute to police deployment and crime 
reduction.  Total staffing is probably the best measure of true law enforcement effort because it 
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takes into account “uniformed” presence that is “not sworn.”  Specifically, for the City of New 
York, Traffic Enforcement Agents and School Safety Agents are a large portion of the NYPD 
staff that are visible, in uniform, have a deterrent effect on crime, and are not counted in the 
sworn officer count.  Unfortunately, the merging of both Traffic Enforcement Agents and School 
Safety Agents into the NYPD occurred in 1996 and 1998 respectively, making the use of this 
measure impractical for the City of New York within the period.  Also, this influx makes total 
sworn personnel difficult to compare with other cities.  
 Total police expenditures is another measure of law enforcement effort that attempts to 
take into account other incidentals that some agencies have provided while not necessarily 
providing staff that would not be evident in a headcount.  For example, some agencies might 
contract with private crime laboratories for forensic analysis at considerable costs to lead to 
better prosecution and convictions of their arrested offenders.  Other agencies suggest that the 
more they pay for an officer leads to a better quality applicant and more effective police officer.  
The measure is effective when comparing total police resources between two municipalities that 
have similar economic conditions and costs of living.  However, it is not particularly effective 
when comparing an extremely affluent city to a poor city.  This particular measurement is not 
superior to any other measure when conducting a longitudinal study across different cities. 
Another measure of Police Presence which is unique to the City of New York is Daily On 
Patrol Strength (DOPS).  This figure was collected on the third week of each month to determine 
how many uniformed officers are physically on patrol.  All commands in the NYPD perform a 
headcount of how many personnel are in radio car and foot patrol.  DOPS also accounts for 
police officers that are assigned for training, court, or other excusals and removes them as 
appropriate.  DOPS is the best measure of uniformed street presence.  Unfortunately, DOPS was 
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started in 1995 and discontinued in 2003.  This measure does not span the examination period of 
1980 through 2009.   Other cities have no equivalent measure. 
 Since this study has a broad scope among several cities with varying populations and 
should reflect Police Presence for the entire time period being examined, police officers per 
capita will be used.  DOPS is the best measure, but does not extend through the entire 
examination period and across all cities.  Total sworn personnel, total staffing, and total police 
expenditures are not as reflective of Police Presence as police officers per capita.  Total sworn 
personnel does not take into account differences in populations among cities or within different 
years within a city.  Total staffing has difficulties due to the merging of traffic and school safety 
agents.  Total police expenditures do not take into account rises due to inflation.   Unfortunately, 
while imperfect, police officers per capita, as reflected in a rate of police officers per 100,000 
residents, is the most consistent measure for Police Presence. 
 Data for staffing levels was obtained from the UCR, Number of Full Time Law 
Enforcement Employees, Cities table for each year.  These figures were then divided by the 
corresponding population reported by the agency in Number of Offenses Known to the Police, 
Cities and Towns 10,000 and over in Population table.  The Police Presence rate was 
standardized by multiplying this figure by 100,000 to obtain a rate of police officers per 100,000. 
2.  Quality of Life Enforcement 
 
Quality of Life Enforcement is a part of deterrence theory, routine activities theory and 
“Broken Windows”.  When police officers are engaged in QOL Enforcement, would be felons 
will see the police engaging people, and possibly themselves, and hopefully be deterred from 
committing a crime.  QOL Enforcement, to a limited extent, affects the severity aspect of 
deterrence theory.  With aggressive QOL Enforcement, repeat minor violators identified as 
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recidivists are arrested more frequently and are likely placed in custody during arrest to 
arraignment processing.  This interim custody is more severe than a fine and is similar to short 
periods of incarceration.  Under routine activities theory, QOL Enforcement should remove 
motivated offenders from areas were they normally commit violations and also remove easy 
targets that may commit violations as well.  The foundation of “Broken Windows” is 
enforcement of violations deemed to affect the quality of life of a neighborhood. 
Quality of Life Enforcement, while having several definitions, focuses on low level 
offenses.  Low level offenses have been generally interpreted to be violations and/or 
misdemeanors.  Some of these offenses cited as QOL infractions are public urination, drinking 
alcoholic beverages in public, littering, trespassing, and loitering.  QOL misdemeanors range 
from smoking marijuana, simple assault, vandalism, graffiti, and prostitution.   While not 
exhaustive, the above activities cover what most people perceive as QOL. 
Measuring quality of life enforcement becomes problematic since QOL Enforcement can 
lead to either an arrest or a summons.  While misdemeanor arrests are regularly reported in the 
UCR, summons enforcement is not.  It is highly likely that most QOL Enforcement would lead 
to the issuance of summonses and the measurement of criminal court summonses would be the 
best measure.  Statistics for the issuance of summonses within the City of New York is available 
and reliable from 1995 onward.  Unfortunately, these figures are not publicly available prior to 
1995 or available in other cities. 
If an agency is engaged in QOL Enforcement, the agency's misdemeanor arrest figures 
must increase to some degree.  These increases are measurable and should show difference in 
effort prior to the QOL initiative.  To accomplish the measurement of QOL Enforcement, the 
surrogate of arrests for certain Part II offenses related to QOL in the UCR was initially 
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considered.  An index created by summing the total number of arrests for vandalism, weapons 
carrying, prostitution, drug abuse, gambling, drunkenness, disorderly conduct, vagrancy, and 
curfew laws is probably the best indicator of QOL Enforcement. This data is available from 1980 
through 2001.  Unfortunately, the NYPD has not reported Part II offenses to the UCR from 2002 
until present.
i
 
The introduction of the Rockefeller Drug Laws in 1973 mandated reporting of drug 
related arrests by each agency within the State of New York.  This reporting is consistent and 
spans the time period from 1980 through 2009.  This mandated reporting requires all controlled 
substance arrests as defined by section 220 of the NYS Penal Law (pertaining predominantly to 
cocaine and opiates) and certain offenses under section 221 of the NYS Penal Law (pertaining 
specifically to marijuana).  Therefore, arrests for drug offenses by the NYPD can be measured 
for the entire 30 year period.  These arrests are also the same arrests that are reported as Drug 
Abuse Violations in Part II Arrests of the UCR. 
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Figure 1 - NYC QOL and Drug Arrests 
 
Examining the chart above shows how close drug arrests parallel QOL Enforcement from 1980 
through 2001.  Drug arrests are a suitable surrogate for all QOL Enforcement.   
In order to compare between cities, drug arrests as reported in the UCR’s Part II Arrests 
by Race and Age for each city were selected.  With the exception of the eight cases from 2002 
through 2009 for New York City mentioned earlier replaced by figures reported to New York 
State’s Department of Criminal Justice Services, there were an additional 9 missing cases: Dallas 
1980, Honolulu 1989, Houston 1980, 1981, and 1988, Las Vegas 1980 and 1997, San Antonio 
1996, and San Jose 2004.  The total drug arrests were then divided by corresponding population 
reported by the agency in Number of Offenses Known to the Police, Cities and Towns 10,000 and 
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over in Population table.   This figure was multiplied by 100,000 to obtain a standardized figure 
of QOL Enforcement arrests per 100,000 residents. 
3. Controls 
 
While many studies controlled for demographics, the methods were questionable.  The 
use of interpolation of years between decennial US Census data has concerns of validity and 
assumes that growth or loss of percentages would act in a linear fashion.  There is no support for 
this assumption.  It is possible that a large influx of people can enter a city in a single year and 
change the racial and age makeup of the city.  This influx can remain in the city and establish the 
new proportions for the next census or can come and go between censuses.  For example, 
Houston’s population can vary greatly during periods of oil leaks from the refineries on the Gulf 
Coast bringing in young males between 21-30 years of age.  Therefore, use of interpolated US 
Census data will not be used.  
The most local level of economic indicators, specifically per capita income and 
unemployment, is available on a yearly basis at the county level.  While county level data is 
extremely local, it does not directly capture the economic conditions of the cities within it.  A 
poor city could exist in an affluent county where the per capita income of the residents in the 
suburbs is much higher than the city residents producing a county per capita income that is not 
reflective of the city.  Unfortunately, there is no reliable indicator of the economy of cities on a 
yearly basis. 
Prison data is predominantly captured at the state level.  Most states track new 
commitments at the county level on a yearly basis as part of their annual reports.  This 
accounting at the county level is based on the fact that county courts are responsible for the trial 
and sentencing of felons in most states and all of the states of the cities in the sample.  Felons are 
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not tried in city courts, so most state department of corrections do not track commitments for 
cities.  For the sample cities, new commitments are available for New York, Philadelphia, Las 
Vegas, and Honolulu.  These jurisdictions are comprised of whole counties.  Unfortunately, 
prison population or commitments cannot be controlled for all 12 cities. 
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V. Analysis and Results 
 
A. Missing Data 
 
The dependent variable, Observable Crime, was missing one data point from Houston in 
1981.  The Quality of Life Index had 9 missing data points from the following cities:  Dallas 
1980, Honolulu 1989, Houston, 1980, 1981, and 1988, Las Vegas 1980 and 1987, San Antonio 
1996, and San Jose 2004.  Houston’s missing observable crime data and QOL Index data 
coincided to the same year.  A total of 9 cases had missing data out of a dataset of 360.  Listwise 
deletion of 1 case was performed for the ANOVA of Observable Crime between cities.  Listwise 
deletion of 9 cases for the model was performed reducing the dataset to 351 cases.  This is 2.5% 
of the cases and within missing data guidelines for the use of listwise deletion.     
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B. Comparison of Means between Cities 
 
An Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was conducted to determine if there was any 
difference between observable crime rates between cities.  The test was performed on 359 cases 
and excluded the 1981 Houston case with missing data.  A difference in the means of observable 
crimes between cities was found F(11,358)=26.186, MSe=218590.3, p<0.001.  
Table 1 - ANOVA of Crime Rates within Cities 
 
  
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Between 
Groups 62964540 11 5724049 26.186 0 
Within 
Groups 75850821 347 218590.3     
Total 1.39E+08 358       
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A Tukey HSD Post Hoc test was also performed to determine which particular cities were 
different from other cities. 
 
Table 2 - Post Hoc Test of ANOVA for Differences between Cities 
(I) City (J) City 
Mean 
Difference (I-
J) 
Std. 
Error Sig. 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Chicago 
Dallas -610.16391* 120.7174 0 -1007.3936 -212.9342 
Honolulu 381.94248 120.7174 0.072 -15.2872 779.1722 
Houston 189.63009 121.7536 0.923 -211.0094 590.2695 
Las Vegas 438.41015* 120.7174 0.017 41.1805 835.6398 
Los 
Angeles 458.59876* 120.7174 0.009 61.3691 855.8285 
New York 464.52007* 120.7174 0.008 67.2904 861.7498 
Philadelphia 557.22728* 120.7174 0 159.9976 954.457 
Phoenix -43.43002 120.7174 1 -440.6597 353.7997 
San Antonio -357.4812 120.7174 0.125 -754.7109 39.7485 
San Diego 676.08494* 120.7174 0 278.8553 1073.3146 
San Jose 897.80878* 120.7174 0 500.5791 1295.0385 
Dallas 
Chicago 610.16391* 120.7174 0 212.9342 1007.3936 
Honolulu 992.10638* 120.7174 0 594.8767 1389.3361 
Houston 799.79399* 121.7536 0 399.1545 1200.4334 
Las Vegas 1048.57405* 120.7174 0 651.3444 1445.8037 
Los 
Angeles 1068.76267* 120.7174 0 671.533 1465.9924 
New York 1074.68398* 120.7174 0 677.4543 1471.9137 
Philadelphia 1167.39118* 120.7174 0 770.1615 1564.6209 
Phoenix 566.73389* 120.7174 0 169.5042 963.9636 
San Antonio 252.6827 120.7174 0.628 -144.547 649.9124 
San Diego 1286.24885* 120.7174 0 889.0192 1683.4785 
San Jose 1507.97268* 120.7174 0 1110.743 1905.2024 
Honolulu 
Chicago -381.94248 120.7174 0.072 -779.1722 15.2872 
Dallas -992.10638* 120.7174 0 -1389.3361 -594.8767 
Houston -192.31239 121.7536 0.915 -592.9518 208.3271 
Las Vegas 56.46767 120.7174 1 -340.762 453.6974 
Los 
Angeles 76.65629 120.7174 1 -320.5734 473.886 
New York 82.57759 120.7174 1 -314.6521 479.8073 
Philadelphia 175.2848 120.7174 0.952 -221.9449 572.5145 
Phoenix -425.37249* 120.7174 0.024 -822.6022 -28.1428 
San Antonio -739.42368* 120.7174 0 -1136.6534 -342.194 
San Diego 294.14246 120.7174 0.384 -103.0872 691.3722 
San Jose 515.86630* 120.7174 0.001 118.6366 913.096 
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Table 2 - Continued 
(I) City (J) City 
Mean 
Difference (I-
J) 
Std. 
Error Sig. 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Houston 
Chicago -189.63009 121.7536 0.923 -590.2695 211.0094 
Dallas -799.79399* 121.7536 0 -1200.4334 -399.1545 
Honolulu 192.31239 121.7536 0.915 -208.3271 592.9518 
Las Vegas 248.78006 121.7536 0.663 -151.8594 649.4195 
Los Angeles 268.96868 121.7536 0.544 -131.6708 669.6081 
New York 274.88999 121.7536 0.509 -125.7495 675.5294 
Philadelphia 367.59719 121.7536 0.107 -33.0423 768.2366 
Phoenix -233.0601 121.7536 0.75 -633.6996 167.5793 
San Antonio -547.11129* 121.7536 0.001 -947.7507 -146.4718 
San Diego 486.45486* 121.7536 0.004 85.8154 887.0943 
San Jose 708.17869* 121.7536 0 307.5392 1108.8181 
Las Vegas 
Chicago -438.41015* 120.7174 0.017 -835.6398 -41.1805 
Dallas -1048.57405* 120.7174 0 -1445.8037 -651.3444 
Honolulu -56.46767 120.7174 1 -453.6974 340.762 
Houston -248.78006 121.7536 0.663 -649.4195 151.8594 
Los Angeles 20.18862 120.7174 1 -377.0411 417.4183 
New York 26.10992 120.7174 1 -371.1198 423.3396 
Philadelphia 118.81713 120.7174 0.998 -278.4126 516.0468 
Phoenix -481.84016* 120.7174 0.005 -879.0699 -84.6105 
San Antonio -795.89135* 120.7174 0 -1193.121 -398.6617 
San Diego 237.6748 120.7174 0.714 -159.5549 634.9045 
San Jose 459.39863* 120.7174 0.009 62.1689 856.6283 
Los 
Angeles 
Chicago -458.59876* 120.7174 0.009 -855.8285 -61.3691 
Dallas -1068.76267* 120.7174 0 -1465.9924 -671.533 
Honolulu -76.65629 120.7174 1 -473.886 320.5734 
Houston -268.96868 121.7536 0.544 -669.6081 131.6708 
Las Vegas -20.18862 120.7174 1 -417.4183 377.0411 
New York 5.92131 120.7174 1 -391.3084 403.151 
Philadelphia 98.62851 120.7174 1 -298.6012 495.8582 
Phoenix -502.02878* 120.7174 0.002 -899.2585 -104.7991 
San Antonio -816.07997* 120.7174 0 -1213.3097 -418.8503 
San Diego 217.48618 120.7174 0.816 -179.7435 614.7159 
San Jose 439.21001* 120.7174 0.016 41.9803 836.4397 
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Table 2 - Continued 
(I) City (J) City 
Mean 
Difference (I-J) 
Std. 
Error Sig. 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
New York 
Chicago -464.52007* 120.7174 0.008 -861.7498 -67.2904 
Dallas -1074.68398* 120.7174 0 -1471.9137 -677.4543 
Honolulu -82.57759 120.7174 1 -479.8073 314.6521 
Houston -274.88999 121.7536 0.509 -675.5294 125.7495 
Las Vegas -26.10992 120.7174 1 -423.3396 371.1198 
Los Angeles -5.92131 120.7174 1 -403.151 391.3084 
Philadelphia 92.7072 120.7174 1 -304.5225 489.9369 
Phoenix -507.95009* 120.7174 0.002 -905.1798 -110.7204 
San Antonio -822.00127* 120.7174 0 -1219.231 -424.7716 
San Diego 211.56487 120.7174 0.842 -185.6648 608.7946 
San Jose 433.28871* 120.7174 0.019 36.059 830.5184 
Philadelphia 
Chicago -557.22728* 120.7174 0 -954.457 -159.9976 
Dallas -1167.39118* 120.7174 0 -1564.6209 -770.1615 
Honolulu -175.2848 120.7174 0.952 -572.5145 221.9449 
Houston -367.59719 121.7536 0.107 -768.2366 33.0423 
Las Vegas -118.81713 120.7174 0.998 -516.0468 278.4126 
Los Angeles -98.62851 120.7174 1 -495.8582 298.6012 
New York -92.7072 120.7174 1 -489.9369 304.5225 
Phoenix -600.65729* 120.7174 0 -997.887 -203.4276 
San Antonio -914.70848* 120.7174 0 -1311.9382 -517.4788 
San Diego 118.85767 120.7174 0.998 -278.372 516.0874 
San Jose 340.5815 120.7174 0.176 -56.6482 737.8112 
Phoenix 
Chicago 43.43002 120.7174 1 -353.7997 440.6597 
Dallas -566.73389* 120.7174 0 -963.9636 -169.5042 
Honolulu 425.37249* 120.7174 0.024 28.1428 822.6022 
Houston 233.0601 121.7536 0.75 -167.5793 633.6996 
Las Vegas 481.84016* 120.7174 0.005 84.6105 879.0699 
Los Angeles 502.02878* 120.7174 0.002 104.7991 899.2585 
New York 507.95009* 120.7174 0.002 110.7204 905.1798 
Philadelphia 600.65729* 120.7174 0 203.4276 997.887 
San Antonio -314.05119 120.7174 0.283 -711.2809 83.1785 
San Diego 719.51496* 120.7174 0 322.2853 1116.7447 
San Jose 941.23880* 120.7174 0 544.0091 1338.4685 
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Table 2 - Continued 
(I) City (J) City 
Mean 
Difference (I-
J) 
Std. 
Error Sig. 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
San 
Antonio 
Chicago 357.4812 120.7174 0.125 -39.7485 754.7109 
Dallas -252.6827 120.7174 0.628 -649.9124 144.547 
Honolulu 739.42368* 120.7174 0 342.194 1136.6534 
Houston 547.11129* 121.7536 0.001 146.4718 947.7507 
Las Vegas 795.89135* 120.7174 0 398.6617 1193.121 
Los 
Angeles 816.07997* 120.7174 0 418.8503 1213.3097 
New York 822.00127* 120.7174 0 424.7716 1219.231 
Philadelphia 914.70848* 120.7174 0 517.4788 1311.9382 
Phoenix 314.05119 120.7174 0.283 -83.1785 711.2809 
San Diego 1033.56615* 120.7174 0 636.3365 1430.7958 
San Jose 1255.28998* 120.7174 0 858.0603 1652.5197 
San Diego 
Chicago -676.08494* 120.7174 0 -1073.3146 -278.8553 
Dallas -1286.24885* 120.7174 0 -1683.4785 -889.0192 
Honolulu -294.14246 120.7174 0.384 -691.3722 103.0872 
Houston -486.45486* 121.7536 0.004 -887.0943 -85.8154 
Las Vegas -237.6748 120.7174 0.714 -634.9045 159.5549 
Los 
Angeles -217.48618 120.7174 0.816 -614.7159 179.7435 
New York -211.56487 120.7174 0.842 -608.7946 185.6648 
Philadelphia -118.85767 120.7174 0.998 -516.0874 278.372 
Phoenix -719.51496* 120.7174 0 -1116.7447 -322.2853 
San Antonio -1033.56615* 120.7174 0 -1430.7958 -636.3365 
San Jose 221.72384 120.7174 0.797 -175.5059 618.9535 
San Jose 
Chicago -897.80878* 120.7174 0 -1295.0385 -500.5791 
Dallas -1507.97268* 120.7174 0 -1905.2024 -1110.743 
Honolulu -515.86630* 120.7174 0.001 -913.096 -118.6366 
Houston -708.17869* 121.7536 0 -1108.8181 -307.5392 
Las Vegas -459.39863* 120.7174 0.009 -856.6283 -62.1689 
Los 
Angeles -439.21001* 120.7174 0.016 -836.4397 -41.9803 
New York -433.28871* 120.7174 0.019 -830.5184 -36.059 
Philadelphia -340.5815 120.7174 0.176 -737.8112 56.6482 
Phoenix -941.23880* 120.7174 0 -1338.4685 -544.0091 
San Antonio -1255.28998* 120.7174 0 -1652.5197 -858.0603 
San Diego -221.72384 120.7174 0.797 -618.9535 175.5059 
* The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.   
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Discussing the cities in descending order of uniqueness, that is, the cities that are the 
most dissimilar from the other cities, Dallas ranked first.  Dallas is unique to all cities except for 
San Antonio and has the highest average observable crime rate.  San Jose is similar only to 
Dallas and Philadelphia and has the lowest mean observable crime rate.  San Antonio and 
Phoenix are unique to 8 cities and have the second and third highest observable mean crime rates 
respectively.  Chicago is dissimilar from 7 other cities and interestingly is different from New 
York, Los Angeles, and Philadelphia.  Houston, Las Vegas, Los Angeles, New York, and San 
Diego are dissimilar from 5 other cities making them common.  Las Vegas, Los Angeles, New 
York, and San Diego were all dissimilar from Chicago, Dallas, Phoenix, San Antonio, and San 
Jose.  Honolulu and Philadelphia are unique from 4 cities, but only share Phoenix and San 
Antonio as dissimilar cities. 
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Most of these differences can be explained by the overall trend of observable crime for 
certain cities.  As can be observed in Figure 2, Las Vegas, Los Angeles, New York, and San 
Diego had similar observable crime rates and a similar trend of crime peaking between 1988 to 
1991 and steadily decreasing to less than half the observable crime rate from the peak.  This 
disproves the uniqueness of New York City that some have claimed (Bratton & Knobler, 1998), 
(Zimring, 2007). 
 
 
Figure 2 - Observable Crime for NYC, Los Angeles, Las Vegas, and San Diego 1980-2009 
 
Las Vegas started at 2,427 Observable Crimes per 100,000, had a slight rise the following 
year then declined to a low of 1,886 observable crimes per 100,000 in 1984. Las Vegas 
maintained a bumpy, downward trend to 1,657 Observable Crimes per 100,000 in 1993, 
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followed by a quick rise to 1,987 the following year and starting a rapid seven year decline to 
1,014 Observable Crimes per 100,000 in 2001.  Peaking again in 2003 to 1,232 Observable 
Crimes per 100,000, Las Vegas declined to 944 Observable Crimes per 100,000 in 2009.  Las 
Vegas had the most erratic police staffing year by year of all cities in the study fluctuating 151 to 
240 police officers per 100,000.  Las Vegas started with an aggressive QOL Enforcement effort 
in the beginning of the period to 1,021 QOL Arrests per 100,000 1989 starting from 509 QOL 
Arrests per 100,000 in 1981. After 1989, Las Vegas steadily reduced QOL Enforcement effort to 
389 QOL Arrests per 100,000 in 2003 before being reinvigorated to 785 QOL Arrests per 
100,000 in 2009. 
Los Angeles started the period with 2,081 Observable Crimes per 100,000 in 1980, 
increased to a high of 2,323 Observable Crimes per 100,000 in 1982, then steadily declined to 
1,913 Observable Crimes per 100,000 in 1987.  After a four year increase to 2,160 Observable 
Crimes per 100,000 in 1991, Los Angeles had a steady decline to 1,069 Observable Crimes per 
100,000 in 1999.  Following a slight bump to 1,135 Observable Crimes per 100,000, Los 
Angeles finished the thirty year period decreasing to 799 Observable Crimes per 100,000 in 
2009.  Starting with 223 police officers per 100,000 in 1980, Los Angeles had a bumpy rise in 
Police Presence to 268 police officers per 100,000 in 1997 and has remained above 235 police 
officers per 100,000 throughout the rest of the 30 year period. Los Angeles started the period 
increasing its QOL Enforcement from 589 QOL Arrests per 100,000 in 1980 to 1,340 QOL 
Arrests per 100,000 in 1989.  After 1989, Los Angeles had a bumpy decline in its QOL 
Enforcement efforts to 429 QOL Arrests per 100,000 in 2009. 
Starting with 2,297 Observable Crimes per 100,000 in 1980, New York increased to 
2,395 Observable Crimes per 100,000 before declining to 2,089 Observable Crimes per 100,000 
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in 1984.  New York increased in Observable Crimes to a peak of 2,417 Observable Crimes per 
100,000 in 1988 and has steadily decreased, with a few bumps, to 680 Observable Crimes per 
100,000.  New York had a steady increase in Police Presence from 321 police officers per 
100,000 in 1980 to 563 police officers per 100,000 in 1999 with a notable jump of 100 police 
officers per 100,000 between 1994 and 1995. After 1999, New York decreased its Police 
Presence gradually to 417 police officers per 100,000 in 2009.  New York had a steady increase 
in QOL Enforcement from 354 QOL Arrests per 100,000 in 1980 to 1,299 QOL Arrests per 
100,000 in 1989, experienced a three year dip in effort to 936 QOL Arrests per 100,000 in 1992, 
followed by a steady increase to its peak of 1,890 QOL Arrests per 100,000 in 1998.  New York 
the decreased its QOL Enforcement efforts to 1,082 QOL Arrests per 100,000 in 2004 followed 
by an increase in effort to 1,293 QOL Arrests per 100,000 by 2009. 
San Diego started the period with 1,919 Observable Crimes per 100,000 in 1980 to a four 
year bumpy decrease to 1,645 Observable Crimes per 100,000 in 1985.  Following a four year 
increase to 2,051 Observable Crimes per 100,000 in 1989, San Diego had a consistent, but 
bumpy, decline in crime to 649 Observable Crimes per 100,000 in 2009.  San Diego and New 
York had the closest Observable Crimes rate patterns which approached the same rate towards 
the end of the 30 year period.   San Diego maintained a Police Presence between 150 to 172 
police officers per 100,000 through the 30 year period.  San Diego maintained aggressive QOL 
Enforcement throughout the 30 year period keeping above 1,000 QOL Arrests per 100,000 for all 
but seven years. 
Los Angeles, New York, and San Diego have similar hiring practices for police officers, 
albeit, at different levels.  In other words, while the police officer rates were different among the 
cities, all three cities shared s similar pattern of a gradual rise until 1992.  After 1992, the three 
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cities aggressively hired police officers to a high point ranging between 1998 through 2000 and 
gradually decreased staffing to 2004.  After the three cities experienced a stabilization of crime, 
staffing levels stabilized.   
QOL Arrest rates for all four cities did not have any similarity.  Las Vegas, Los Angeles, 
and San Diego peaked in QOL Arrests in 1989 and decreased its QOL Enforcement in the 
following years.  New York steadily increased its QOL Enforcement through 1988, had a slight 
decline through 1992, and then had a rapid rise through 1998.  The enforcement patterns showed 
no common thread. 
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Chicago, Dallas, Phoenix, and San Antonio had high observable crime rates that never 
dipped below 1500 observable crimes per 100,000.  As can be seen in figure 3, all four cities had 
similar Observable Crime trends with different values from 1980 through 1994.  In 1995 all four 
cities converge to Observable Crime rates between 2,100 to 2,500 Observable crimes per 
100,000 in 2009.  After 2000, Dallas and San Antonio decrease at a separate rate from Chicago 
and Phoenix.  These cities that remained with high Observable Crime rates at the end of the 30 
year period were analyzed separately below. 
 
 
Figure 3 - Observable Crime Rates for Chicago, Dallas, Phoenix, and San Antonio 1980-2009 
 
Chicago started the 30 year period with 1,734 Observable Crimes per 100,000 in 1980 
and had a bumpy increase to 2,839 Observable Crimes per 100,000 in 1991.  Following 1991, 
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
4500
Chicago Dallas Phoenix San Antonio
 Reduction in Crime 1990-2009 
61 
 
Chicago had a steady and bumpy decrease to 1,458 Observable Crimes per 100,000.  Chicago 
had a large Police Presence consistently over 400 police officers per 100,000 residents and 
ranked in the top two cities with the exception of 1999.  Ranking first place in QOL Enforcement 
from 1995 onward, Chicago was in a class of its own with over 1,500 QOL arrests per 100,000 
from 1995 through 2009.  No other similarities can be seen between Chicago and the other cities.  
Dallas had a large rise from 2,848 Observable Crimes per 100,000 in 1980 to 3,992 
Observable Crimes per 100,000 in 1987.  Dallas experienced a rapid crime decline to 2,255 
Observable Crimes per 100,000 in 1994 and kept a steady and bumpy Observable Crime rate 
through 2001.  With a slight rise to 2,333 Observable Crimes per 100,000 in 2003, Dallas 
steadily declined to 1,570 Observable Crimes per 100,000 in 2009.  Dallas increased it police 
Presence to 278 police officers per 100,000 in 1991 from 221 police officers per 100,000 in 
1980.  Dropping to 229 police officers per 100,000 in 2002, Dallas increased its staffing to 277 
police officers per 100,000 in 2009.  Dallas’ QOL Enforcement steadily declined throughout the 
entire 30 year period.  
Phoenix stated the 30 year period 2,969 Observable Crimes per 100,000 and quickly 
declined to 2,079 Observable Crimes per 100,000 in 1983 before rising to 2,659 Observable 
Crimes per 100,000 in 1989.  After a three year decline to 2,072 Observable Crimes per 100,000 
in 1992, Phoenix increased to 2,558 Observable Crimes per 100,000 in 1995 before steadily 
declining to 1,156 Observable Crimes per 100,000 in 2009.  Phoenix had a stable Police 
Presence throughout the 30 year period hovering around 200 police officers perm 100,000. 
Phoenix had a steady increase in QOL Enforcement to a peak of 614 QOL Arrests per 100,000 in 
1998 before declining to 410 QOL Arrests per 100,000 at the end of the period. 
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Starting with 1,755 Observable Crimes per 100,000 in 1980, San Antonio steadily 
increased crime to 3,275 Observable Crimes per 100,000 in 1988.  Following a steady 
Observable Crime rate through 1991, San Antonio had a bumpy 8 year decline to 2,043 
Observable Crimes per 100,000 in 1999.  With a rise and fall, San Antonio finished the 30 year 
period with 2,135 Observable Crimes per 100,000 in 2009 and was the only city to have an 
increase in Observable Crimes from its 1980 rate.   San Antonio had a low Police Presence 
throughout the 30 year period fluctuating between 132 to 182 police officers per 100,000.  After 
2002, San Antonio’s QOL Enforcement started to aggressively pick up from 480 QOL Arrests 
per 100,000 to a high of 1,146 QOL Arrests per 100,000 in 2006. 
Dallas, by far, had the highest Observable Crime rate for all of the cities and ranked in 
the top three cities for the entire period. San Antonio originally started in the lower half of cities 
in crime in the beginning of the 30 year period, then started gaining ranking to second place in 
1985.  Dallas and San Antonio have similar Observable Crimes rate trends.  Phoenix also had 
similar Observable Crime rate trends with the exception of a spike that peaked in 1995.  Outside 
of Dallas and San Antonio being part of Texas and all three cities being located in the southwest, 
the Police Presence and QOL Enforcement were dissimilar. 
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Honolulu, Houston, Philadelphia, and San Jose are four cities that do not fall into the 
previous two groups of cities in trend or rates of Observable Crime.  Honolulu, Houston, and San 
Jose have similar values of Observable Crime rates in 1980.  The three cities take separate paths.  
San Jose has a continuous decline with bumps through the entire 30 years.  Houston peaks in 
1990 and continues to fall until 1995, then stabilizes for the next 14 years.  Honolulu has peaks 
and valleys throughout its 30 year period.  Philadelphia’s trend in observable crimes is 
unorthodox and incomparable to any other city.  A more detailed analysis of each city follows 
below. 
 
 
Figure 4 - Observable Crime Rates for Honolulu, Houston, Philadelphia, and San Jose 1980-2009 
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 Honolulu started the 30 year period with 2,081 Observable Crimes per 100,000 in 1980 
and declined to 1,517 Observable Crimes per 100,000 by 1985 before rising to 2,267 Observable 
Crimes per 100,000 in 1995.  After a four year decline to 1,500 Observable Crimes per 100,000i 
1999, Honolulu increased crime 1,766 Observable Crimes per 100,000 in 2002 and finally 
declined in crime to 1,126 Observable Crimes per 100,000 in 2009. Honolulu had a police 
presence fluctuating between 157 to 235 police officers per 100,000 with no clearly observable 
pattern affecting its Observable Crime.  With the exception of a peak to 476 QOL Arrests per 
100,000 in 1984, Houston had a continuous decline in QOL Enforcement through the 3o year 
period, 
 Starting with 1,680 Observable Crimes per 100,000, Houston initially declined in crime 
to 1,821 Observable Crimes per 100,000 in 1984 and rose in crime to its peak of 2,439 
Observable Crimes per 100,000 in 1990.  After a four year decline to 1,663 Observable Crimes 
per 100,000 in 1994, Houston maintained a bumpy, but steady Observable Crime rate through 
the rest of the 30 year period ending with 1,684 Observable Crimes per 100,000 in 2009.  
Houston increased it Police Presence from 195 police officers per 100,000 in 1980 to 303 police 
officers per 100,000 in 1997.  After 1997, Houston decreased its Police Presence to 236 police 
officers per 100,000 in 2009.  While Houston had a QOL Enforcement effort in the 30 year 
period, it did not place great effort into QOL Enforcement until after 2005.  
 Philadelphia started the 30 year period with 1,380 Observable Crimes per 100,000 
in 1980, declined in crime to a low of 1,199 Observable Crimes per 100,000 in 1984, and had a 
continuous, bumpy crime rise through 1999 to 1,881 Observable Crimes per 100,000.  After a 3 
year decline to 1,387 Observable Crimes per 100,000 in 2002, Philadelphia increased in crime to 
1,551 Observable Crimes per 100,000 in 2008 prior to finishing with 1,350 Observable Crimes 
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per 100,000 in 2009.  Philadelphia had a large police presence that remained in the top three 
rankings for the 30 year period maintaining a rate above 365 police officers per 100,000.  While 
Philadelphia had some effort in QOL Enforcement through the 30 year period, it only started 
seriously picking up its QOL Enforcement after 1996.  By 2000, Philadelphia increased its QOL 
Enforcement to 1,416 QOL Arrests per 100,000.  This coincided with its modest crime decline in 
the same period.  Outside of similarities in staffing with Chicago and New York, Philadelphia 
did not have any similarities with other cities. 
San Jose had a unique experience in Observable Crime rates with a consistent decline 
throughout the entire period and maintained a low Observable Crime rate ranking in the lowest 
three cities.  Starting with 2.094 Observable Crimes per 100,000, San Jose spiked to 2,205 
Observable Crimes per 100,000 in 1981 prior to a steady decrease through 2000 to 622 
Observable Crimes per 100,000.  After 2000, San Jose maintained a steady crime rate and 
finished with 649 Observable Crimes per 100,000 in 2009.  While San Jose did increase its 
Police Presence, it consistently had the lowest Police Presence throughout the entire period with 
the exception of three years and never broke more than 160 police officers per 100,000.   San 
Jose was quick to start and increase QOL Enforcement breaking 1,200 QOL Arrests per 100,000 
by 1986. 
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C. General Linear Model 
 
Having determined a significant difference between cities, a preliminary analysis of the 
variables was performed to determine suitability of assumptions for inclusion in a General Linear 
Model.  Analysis of the variables provided the following descriptive statistics and has been 
presented below: 
 
 
Table 3 - Descriptive Statistics 
  
N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Statistic Statistic Statistic 
Observable Crime 359 1789.466 622.69768 
Police Presence 360 258.9 108.8157132 
QOL Enforcement 351 776.6549 427.6671662 
 
In addition to the mean and standard deviations reported above, the variables were tested for 
skewness and kurtosis and all were found to be within acceptable levels with absolute values 
below 1. 
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A correlation analysis was performed to determine if any of the variables had potential 
correlation issues.  Police Presence had a positive correlation to QOL Enforcement but well 
below the 0.80 threshold that would indicate concerns for collinearity. 
 
Table 4 - Bivariate Correlations of Variables 
   
    
Observable 
Crime 
Police 
Presence 
QOL 
Enforcement Correlations  
   
Observable 
Crime 
Pearson 
Correlation 1 
  
  
Sig. (2-tailed)   
N 359 
Police 
Presence 
Pearson 
Correlation -0.042 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.424   
N 359 360 
QOL 
Enforcement 
Pearson 
Correlation -.154** .529** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.004 0   
N 351 351 351 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).  
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Due to missing data, a GLM was run using 351 cases testing the effect of Police Presence 
and QOL Enforcement on Observable Crime.  The model proved to be significant 
(F(2,348)=4.591, p=0.011) and explained 2.6% of the variance. 
A review of the coefficients shows that QOL Enforcement (B=-0.264, t=-2.915, p= 
0.004) was a significant factor in reducing observable crime controlling for Police Presence.  The 
95% confidence interval for Police Presence has a large range from -0.399 to 0.99 across zero 
demonstrating that Police Presence was an unreliable estimate.  QOL Enforcement had a 95% 
confidence interval between -0.442 and -0.086 making QOL Enforcement a reliable estimate.  
.   
Table 5 - Coefficients of Model 
 
  
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
Beta t Sig. 
95.0% Confidence 
Interval for B 
B Std. Error 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
(Constant) 1913.358 87.418   21.887 0 1741.424 2085.293 
Police 
Officer 
Presence 0.296 0.353 0.052 0.838 0.403 -0.399 0.99 
QOL 
Enforcement -0.264 0.091 -0.182 -2.915 0.004 -0.442 -0.086 
 
For every increase in QOL Enforcement per 100,000 people, a reduction of 0.264 
observable crimes per 100,000 can be expected.  In a city with 1,000,000 residents, if the police 
made 100 arrests for QOL Enforcement, a decrease of 2.64 observable crimes could be expected. 
D. Results of Test of Hypotheses 
 
The results of the individual hypotheses are presented below. 
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RH0: The following variables did not contribute to the reduction of observable crime from 1980-
2009 was disproved.  
 
H1: Police Presence had a significant impact on the reduction of observable crime from 1980-
2009 was not proven.  While the primary null hypothesis was disproven, the GLM demonstrated 
no significant effect. 
 
H2: QOL Enforcement had a significant impact on the reduction of observable crime from 1980-
2009 was proven.  Results of the GLM demonstrated a statistically significant effect of reducing 
0.264 observable crimes per 100,000. 
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VI. Discussion 
 
This study showed an effect of Quality of Life Enforcement on Observable Crime in the 
12 largest cities in the US.  Caution must be taken when discussing this result of due to the weak 
strength of the model.  It is surprising that Police Presence did not have a significant impact.  A 
prerequisite of QOL Enforcement is that the police staff is needed to perform the enforcement.  
Reduction of crime from QOL Enforcement is in agreement with Corman and Mocan (1995) and 
Kelling and Sousa (2001).  
QOL Enforcement can have an impact on crime.  Looking at the aggregate level of 
260,246 QOL Arrests in all 12 cities in 2009 for a population of 27,734,277 people, a rate of 938 
QOL Arrests per 100,000 was produced.  To make a reduction of 264 Observable Crimes per 
100,000 across all 12 cities in 2009, 1,000 QOL Arrests per 100,000 or, an additional 277,343 
QOL Arrests would be needed.  Each of the 87,452 police officers in the 12 cities would need to 
make an additional three QOL Arrests.  While the additional three arrest figure must be used 
with caution, the point of this example is to demonstrate the Observable Crime reduction is 
feasible and does not take Herculean effort. 
The lack of a significant finding for Police Presence is in agreement with Levine (1975), 
Humphries and Wallace (1980), Greenberg, Kessler, and Loftin (1983), Lofitn and McDowall 
(1982), and Chamlin and Langworthy (1996).  All of these studies examined police staffing at 
the city level and did not find any effect on crime.  Matthieson and Passell (1976), Huff and 
Stahura (1980), and Levitt (1995) did find effects of Police Presence on crime and are in 
disagreement this finding.  Matthieson and Passell, and Huff and Stahura were cross-sectional 
studies of cities in one year.  This may explain the difference in findings.  While Levitt’s study 
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was a time series with 32 years of data at the city level, his primary focus was on electoral cycles 
and his use of controls for demographics, welfare, and educational expenses was questionable.   
Lack of controls for demographic, prison, and economic data is a concern for the study.  
As mentioned earlier, there were no reliable controls at the city level that could account for these 
measures.  Previous research that used such controls from interpolation of decennial data or 
using the decennial data for all years of the study generally did not find a significant effect for 
the controls.  City level controls must be developed. 
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VII. Conclusions 
A. General Conclusions 
1. QOL Enforcement Reduces Observable Crime 
 
QOL Enforcement reduces crime and its effect can be realized by any large municipality 
that chooses to implement it.  By starting a program of QOL Enforcement that and having police 
officers arrest 3 to 6 more people a year, a reduction in observable crimes can be realized.  This 
is little effort for a modest return.  Police agencies within cities should either create efforts to 
focus on QOL Enforcement or expand QOL Enforcement efforts by either placing more officers 
in assignments for QOL Enforcement or having police officers in existing patrol assignments 
engage in QOL Enforcement for some part of their tour.   
COMPSTAT supporters are somewhat supported by the effect of QOL Enforcement on 
Observable Crime.  Most implementations of COMPSTAT place great emphasis on QOL 
Enforcement.   For those that equate COMPSTAT to QOL Enforcement, this study lends support 
to the implementation of COMPSTAT as a tool to reduce Observable Crime. 
2. Police Presence, By Itself, Does Not Reduce Observable 
Crime 
 
While QOL Enforcement reduces crime, simply increasing the number of police officers 
may not have the desired effect of reducing observable crime.  The study determined that Police 
Presence did not have a significant effect on observable crime.  It was the action the police 
officers were doing that was more important.  Municipalities should consider the specific 
assignments of police officers when making staffing models and deployment decisions.  Simply 
hiring new officers to be placed on patrol assignments may not be productive.  Also, a better 
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indicator that can more accurately measure the number of police in an agency that are in a 
position to see observable crimes is needed. 
3. Drug Enforcement, as Manifested through QOL Enforcement, 
Reduces Observable Crime 
 
With QOL Enforcement focusing on drug arrests, the enforcement of drug laws did lead 
to a reduction in Observable Crime.  Another method of crime reduction can be realized through 
drug enforcement as measured by drug arrests.  This method of implementation may be easier for 
some municipalities and may be more likely disposed to external funding.  Additionally, drug 
enforcement might be more politically viable then QOL Enforcement in some political 
environments.  With Stop and Frisk actions generally associated with QOL Enforcement 
programs, drug enforcement programs may be more popular. 
B.    Limitations 
 
As with all research, this study and the conclusions based on the model employed have 
some limitations to be discussed below.  First, the model only applies to cities with populations 
of approximately 950,000 residents or more.  The model limits the results to the top the twelve 
most populated cities.  A further expansion of the model would have to be tested across medium 
and small size cities.   
Second, the use of secondary data is problematic.  Secondary data is only as accurate as 
the voluntary municipality records its crimes, arrests, and police staffing and transfers this 
information to the FBI for reporting in the UCR.  There are reporting errors and inconsistencies.  
The author has contacted several agencies to correct data that appeared to be in error.  The 
NYPD provided more accurate data for one reporting year on police staffing that was clearly in 
Andrew Costello 
74 
 
error.  The Chicago Police Department provided more accurate Part II arrest data for several 
years where reporting was either incomplete or missing.  The Las Vegas Metropolitan Police 
Department affirmed its staffing figures to be as accurate, but the erratic changes in staffing 
levels between years still seems suspect.  Other cities did not respond to requests for 
clarification. 
Third, the data used to represent the factors may not be the best representation of the 
factors.  Certain Part II arrests, and in this case drug arrests, may not be the best measure for 
QOL Enforcement.  A larger subset of Part II arrests should be used for future research.  The 
inclusion of summonses for violations would provide a better indicator of QOL contacts.  Better 
measure may produce different results. 
Fourth, the lack of control data available at the city level is problematic.  While prison 
and income data is available at the state and county level, obtaining this data at the city level was 
impossible for the entire time series.  Demographic data such as percent white, percent female 
headed households, and percentage of certain male age groups would have been useful, if 
available.  The study’s original concept was to include controls for demographics, income, and 
sentencing policies.  Due to data limitations based on Units of analysis at the city level, this was 
not possible.  For a more detailed explanation and information, see Appendix A.  
Fifth, as demonstrated by Duhem and Quine, with hypothesis testing, it is impossible to 
test any hypothesis in isolation.  Since the test of the hypothesis required assumptions, deriving 
predictions from the hypothesis requires that all background assumptions be correct (Gillies, 
1998) (Van Orman Quine).  In this case, the assumptions that police officers per 100,000 were 
accurate of Police Presence and drug arrests were accurate for QOL Enforcement.  Additionally, 
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both of these measures were assumed to be consistent between cities as well as the measure for 
Observable Crime. 
Lastly, the model also assumes that there are no spurious effects that are unknown.  
While it is never impossible to rule spurious results from any model, it is quite possible that there 
are unknown factors that coincided with the crime decrease and the included factors that were 
not determined.  Caution was taken to consider several factors and many were excluded during 
preliminary analysis.  This possibility still exists. 
C. Future Direction for Research 
1. Better QOL Enforcement Measure 
 
The use of arrest data as a QOL Enforcement measure is problematic and may have led to 
its lack of significance as an explanatory factor.  QOL Enforcement that includes summonses 
issued to violators of petty offenses and stops made by police to intercede prior to the 
commitment of a petty offense should provide a better measure.  Currently, most municipalities 
do not publically record this data. 
2. Expansion to More Cities 
 
A benefit of this model is that it can be replicated down to most cities and counties as the 
data is publically available for all measures after 1980.  Part I offenses and Part II arrests are 
available by most agencies from the Bureau of Justice Services.  Further studies across additional 
cities are recommended. Specifically, a study focusing on cities that comprise whole counties 
should be performed and controls that area available at the county level should be included.  
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VIII. Appendix A – Limitations on Controls Related to Demographics and 
Economics 
 
The original scope of this study looked to examine the effects of Police Presence and 
QOL and also included effect of sentencing policies, cellular phone proliferation, and economic 
conditions controlling for demographic conditions.  Presented below are the original research 
questions and hypotheses for the initial scope upon completion of the literature review.  (Please 
note that expected utility theory was added after the decision to remove the other variables.) 
After reviewing the relevant theories and their association to reduction of crime in the 
1990s, several hypotheses are proposed.  Each hypothesis is briefly described.   
RQ:  Did the following variables contribute to the reduction of crime from 1980-2009? 
 Police Presence 
 Quality of Life (QOL) Enforcement 
 Enhanced Sentencing and Penalties 
 Proliferation of Cellular Phones  
 Economy 
 
RH0: The following variables did not contribute to the reduction of crime from 1980-2009: 
 Police Presence 
 QOL Enforcement 
 Enhanced Sentencing and Penalties 
 Proliferation of Cellular Phones  
 Economy 
 
RH1: Does Police Presence, quality of life enforcement, Enhanced Sentencing and Penalties, 
Proliferation of Cellular Phones contribute to the reduction of crime? 
   
 H0: Police Presence, QOL Enforcement, Enhanced Sentencing and Penalties, 
Proliferation of Cellular Phones, and Economy did not contribute to the reduction of 
crime in the 1990s.  
This is the null hypothesis and must be disproved with any 
hypothesis testing.  This hypothesis supposes that the changes in 
crime are purely accidental and that at some time this reduced crime 
trend will return to the norm. 
Applicable Theories: None   
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H1: Police Presence had a significant impact on the reduction of crime from 1980-2009. 
A preferred answer by most politicians, this hypothesis assumes that 
there is a negative correlation between the number of crimes and the 
number of police officers.   
Applicable Theories:  
Deterrence - By placing more officers, the likelihood of 
apprehension should increase. 
Routine Activity - The more police officers that exists, the more 
capable guardians are present to prevent crime. 
Broken Windows – Larger Police Presence will allow for greater 
placement of police officers in more disorderly areas therefor 
disrupting crime prone areas. 
H2: QOL Enforcement had a significant impact on the reduction of crime from 1980-2009. 
Another preferred answer by some law enforcement practitioners, 
the enforcement of low level crimes set a tone to offenders that 
more serious crimes would not be tolerated.  Assuming violations, 
infractions, and misdemeanors are enforced, fewer felonies should 
occur.  This explanation also involves the application of 
COMPSTAT.  COMPSTAT can be measured by the enforcement of 
QOL offenses. 
Applicable Theories:  
Deterrence - By enforcing low level crimes, offenders may fear a 
greater likelihood of capture.  
Broken Windows - By enforcing low level crimes, people will feel 
uncomfortable or become intolerant of serious crime.  
H3: Enhanced Sentencing and Penalties had a significant impact on the reduction of crime from 
1980-2009. 
Another popular stance for most politicians, the hypothesis 
supposes that enhanced sentences will either prevent potential 
offenders from committing crimes or incapacitate offenders from 
committing crimes. 
 
Applicable Theories:  
Deterrence - Sentence severity should affect the decisions of the 
human calculator when choosing to commit a crime.   
Routine Activity – Incapacitation through severe sentencing 
removes offenders.  
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H4: Proliferation of Cellular Phones had a significant impact on the reduction of crime from 
1980-2009. 
While never claimed by mainstream criminologists or practitioners, 
the reduction in crime in the 1990s did coincide with the emergence 
of this new technology.  If cellular phone subscriptions coincide 
with crime reduction, this hypothesis may have merit. 
Applicable Theories:  
Deterrence – Cellular phones may increase the probability of 
detection of criminal acts, giving more surety of apprehension of 
offenders. 
Routine Activity – Cellular phones may be a tool that transfers 
anybody into a more capable guardian.  This increase in guardians 
should reduce crime. 
H5: Economy had a significant impact on the reduction of crime from 1980-2009. 
Assuming many crimes are committed out of desperation, good 
economic times should lead to less desperation and less crime.  A 
negative correlation between economic conditions and crime should 
be evident if this hypothesis is true. 
Applicable Theories:  
Deterrence – Better economic times should produce more licit 
opportunities.  Therefore, individuals should rationally choose the 
licit direction as opposed to the illicit direction. 
Routine Activity – increased availability and affordability of 
consumer goods should reduce the need of offenders to obtain 
targets. 
  
Consideration for the use of Enhanced Sentencing and Penalties, Proliferation of cellular 
Phones, and the Economy were considered.  The theoretical basis for the use of these variables 
are presented below along with their reasons for rejection. Enhanced Sentencing and Penalties 
and the Economy were rejected based on units of analysis being inconsistent with cities.  
Proliferation of cellular phones was rejected due to strong concerns that the relationship could be 
spurious without an adequate foundation of it being linked to 911 calls.  
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1. Enhanced Sentencing and Penalties 
 
The 1990s had several forms of sentence severity.  “Three strikes and you’re out” laws, 
the concept of giving a harsher sentence when a person was convicted of their third felony, were 
popular and enacted in several states  (Dickey & Hollenhorst, 1999).  Other states chose 
enhanced sentence lengths that would place longer incarceration periods for certain crimes or for 
special circumstances.  The death penalty was enacted in a few states.  Although execution 
proves to be problematic due to several legal restraints, the practical result is a person kept in 
custody indefinitely.   All three forms of Enhanced Sentencing and Penalties translate in 
prisoners spending more time in correctional facilities.   
Incarceration can be measured by jail admissions, jail populations, prison admissions, and 
prison populations.  Both jail admissions and jail populations are problematic in that jail 
admissions count entry of inmates and not their sentence length and jail populations are 
snapshots taken midyear of inmates with incarceration periods of hours to a year.  While prison 
admissions include inmates that have been convicted of sentences over one year, it is not 
indicative of sentence severity.  Prison populations are indicative of sentence severity because 
the longer, the more inclusive, and harsher the sentencing program, the more years the inmates 
will be incarcerated.  As more prisoners get harsher sentences, they will serve more years in 
prison, and the overall prison population will reflect the increase. 
Therefore, the best aggregate measure for sentencing programs is state prison population.  
This figure obtained from the Bureau of Justice Statistics Prisoner Section (BJSPS) is collected 
every year on December 31.  This measure is consistent among states and is reliable over the 
entire time period.  To account for differences between state populations, each state prison 
population will be divided by the state population as reported to BJSPS in the same year and 
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multiplied by 100,000 to provide a prisoner rate.  This uniform measure would be indicative of 
changes in sentencing practices between states and is reliable whatever specific policy was 
enacted. 
The selected cities encompass eight states: Arizona, California, Hawaii, Illinois, Nevada, 
New York, Pennsylvania, and Texas.  The state prison rate will be used as the measure for 
Enhanced Sentencing and Penalties for each city within a state despite the number of selected 
cities within the state.  More specifically, California has the three selected cities of Los Angeles, 
San Diego, and San Jose.  Texas has three selected cities of Dallas, Houston, and San Antonio.  
Prison policies are determined at the state level by state legislative branches and in principal 
should be the same for each city within the state.  There was no missing data for state prison 
populations or state population estimates. 
 Reduction in Crime 1990-2009 
81 
 
Below is a chart of state prison rates for the eight states of the twelve selected cities.  The 
overall trend in prison rates has been a steady increase since 1980.  Notable exceptions are 
Nevada and New York.  Both states have decreased their prison rates starting in 1997 and 1999 
respectively.  
 
Figure 5 - State Prison Rates for Selected Cities 
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The increase in prison rates for most states appears to be significant graphically and will 
be examined in greater detail.  Using San Jose as an example, the chart below shows California’s 
prison rate versus Suppressible Crime.  As California’s incarceration rate rose, San Jose’s 
Suppressible Crime decreases.  Even the slopes between the two curves are reflections of each 
other. This chart shows an inverse relationship between Suppressible Crime and Enhanced 
Sentencing and Penalties. 
 
Figure 6 - California Prison Rate vs. San Jose Crime 
 
Unfortunately, while state prison rates may reflect the sentencing policies of cities within 
the states, it is not conclusively the sentencing policy of the city within the particular state.  The 
units of analysis between the state and the city cannot be resolved.  Also, the number of 
commitments from each city being held by state prisons by year was considered as an 
appropriate control to for sentencing policies of the particular cities.  After speaking with several 
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staff members from six different states, it was apparent that the states collected extremely 
reliable new commitment, current commitment, and releases by county.  All of the states had the 
same structure of felonies being tried and committed at the county level within their states.  This 
also involved their billing structures to the counties (Devoe, 2013) (Lanes, 2013).  Ultimately, 
both measures were rejected and no suitable substitute was found.   
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2. Proliferation of Cellular Phones 
 
Cellular telephones were first introduced in 1973.  The Proliferation of Cellular Phones 
has taken off dramatically since its inception.  Below is a chart of cell phone subscribers for the 
nation from 1985 to 2010 based on data collected by the Cellular International Telephone 
Association (CITA).  This trade organization collects national data from participating cell phone 
companies annually on a volunteer basis.  Although argued, its voluntary membership in the 
United States is believed to be representative of 95% of all cellular phone service (CITA, 2012).  
 
 
 
Figure 7 - Cell Phone Subscribers by Year  
 
 Having determined the increase in cell phone usage, attempts were made to obtain data in 
reference to the number of 911 calls made by cell phones.  While the NYPD collects the (ANI-
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ALI) of every 911 call, the system is not fully reliable to capture every return call number.  This 
problem is more evident with what is believed to be cell phones versus land lines.  Also, the 
NYPD will not disclose such data.  Similar requests have been made to other agencies with no 
success.  
Having failed in determining the number of 911 calls made by cell phones, a diligent 
search was made to find the number of cell phone subscribers within a particular city.  
Determining cell phone subscribers at a local level (such as a city) is also problematic.  CITA 
collects data nationally and does not collect data at any local level.  The Federal 
Communications Commission, which has oversight over cellular phone carriers, does not have 
publically available data at local levels.  Requests were made to cell phone carriers, but none 
responded with any information.  
To capture the number of potential cell phones in a particular city, data was obtained 
from Area-Codes.com.  This company, among others, captures data about phone exchanges for 
commercial purposes.  The data is based on the North American Pooling Administration (NAPA) 
established by the ATT and Bell Laboratories in 1947 under the North American Numbering 
Plan.  This administration was originally in charge of providing exchange pools to Competitive 
Local Exchange Carriers (CLEC) that were providing land line service prior to the existence of 
wireless technology (NNPA, 2012).   
A pool would consist of an area code, known as an NPA, and an exchange, known as an 
NXX.  The area code was geographically based to assist in routing calls with switches with the 
first digit between 2 and 9 and a middle digit that was either 0 or 1.  Based on rotary dial service, 
the larger the city (in population) covered by an area code, the lower the area code.  New York 
City was originally 212.  Upstate New York, that is just north of New York City, which at the 
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time was rural, was originally 914.  The exchange was based upon the location of a Central 
Office, that is, the local switching room for the phone lines in an area. Originally, the first two 
numbers of the exchange were supposed to correspond to letters that spelled the beginning of the 
area were the Central Office was located.  For example, Lakeland, a hamlet in Yorktown, New 
York, had an exchange of 528.  This corresponded to Lakeland 8, or LA8.  So, a pool consists of 
an area code, such as 212, and an exchange, such as 237, and consists of a range of 10,000 phone 
numbers, such as 212-237-0000 through 212-237-9999. 
With the emergence of wireless technology, specifically the pager, the NAPA adjusted its 
policy to create exchanges that were solely for wireless communication.  In other words, an 
exchange would be dedicated to either land line use or wireless use.  While land line exchanges 
were, and are still, geographically based on a hard lined Central Office, wireless exchanges were 
not based on a Central Office.  Wireless exchanges are still area code based and should 
correspond to the city that the cell phone subscriber lived in when the subscriber purchased the 
phone.  While initially designed for all wireless devices, pagers have lost popularity.  Most of the 
devices on a wireless exchange are cell phones.   
Additionally, the NAPA set a policy that wireless carriers could register for new phone 
pools after a certain saturation level of their existing pools was reached.  In other words, after a 
cell phone company reached 50% of the numbers utilized within a pool, the wireless carrier 
would have to make a reasonable estimate of the date for the 80% saturation rate.  This date 
would be used as a projected date for the assignment of a new pool to the carrier.  Although a 
wireless carrier will keep a certain reserve within a pool, the number of cell phones (not 
subscribers) can be inferred by the number of wireless pools within an area code. 
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The area code database collects information about the type of use for each exchange for 
all area codes in the United States.  The database includes information such as the city of 
coverage and the date of introduction into their database.   This date of introduction is within six 
months of the date of assignment from NAPA.  The area code database did not collect 
introduction dates until 1994.  While unfortunate that this information is not available prior to 
1994, the data is still useful.  Second Generation (2G) technology started to emerge in 1990, but 
did not start effectively marketing until 1994.  Prior to 1994, the number of cell phones in a 
particular city will be estimated based on the national trend from 1985 to 1994 (NNPA, 2012).   
Wireless exchanges for the selected cities were extracted from the area code database and 
the pools were assigned year of introduction based upon the date of introduction.  These area 
codes and exchanges were then tallied by year for the area codes that correspond to each city.  A 
cumulative total was then made for each city by year from 1994 onward to determine the number 
of potential cell phones available to the city.  To control for variations in population, these 
figures were then divided by corresponding population reported by the agency in Number of 
Offenses Known to the Police, Cities and Towns 10,000 and over in Population table and 
multiplied by 100,000 to create a rate of cell phone exchanges per 100,000 residents.  The 
denominator was selected to be consistent with rates of other variables.  Once again, the Houston 
population for 1981 was estimated by taking the average of the populations from 1980 and 1982. 
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Below is a chart of the total number of wireless exchanges per 100,000 for each of the 
selected cities from 1994 through 2009.  Note the rapid growth of exchanges in all cities from 
1994 through 2000.  All of the cities seem to level off after 2005.  Also, the older cities (New 
York, Los Angeles, Honolulu, and Philadelphia) with established landline communications 
structures and hilly environments have lower Proliferation of Cellular Phones than the Western 
cities (Dallas, Houston, Las Vegas, Phoenix, and San Antonio) that have flat geography.  
 
Figure 8 - Cell Phone Exchanges per 100,000 for Twelve Cities 
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Los Angeles best demonstrated the effect of Proliferation of Cellular Phones on crime.  
The chart below shows Suppressible Crime versus Proliferation of Cellular Phones.  While the 
data is incomplete prior to 1985, it appears as if the increase and stabilization of cell phones in 
California is inversely proportional to the decrease in Suppressible Crime in Los Angeles. 
 
Figure 9 - Los Angeles Cell Phone Proliferation vs. Crime 
 
Unfortunately, while cell phone proliferation provides a good surrogate for how many 
cell phones are in a particular city, it does not indicate the cell phones direct use as a crime 
reduction tool.  Unless a foundation can be established to determine 911 cell phone use 
associated to overall cell phone proliferation, this measure is ineffective, for it cannot rule out 
legitimate arguments of a spurious effect.  The measure was rejected and no suitable measure 
was found to capture the effect of cell phones on crime reduction. 
  
Andrew Costello 
90 
 
3. Economy 
 
While there is no shortage of economic indicators, income seems to be the only economic 
indicator that is easy to gather reliably.  Logically, at least at the surface, it would seem desperate 
people without enough income might be swayed to commit criminal acts.  While the literature 
supports and refutes associations of income with crime, the measure will be used.  Income is 
complicated.  There are three measures of central tendency for income:  average, median and 
mode.  The variance of income by extreme outliers makes the use of average income 
problematic.  The mode simply indicates what most common.  With annual salaries varying by 
pennies, this is not particularly useful.   Median household income would be the most ideal.  
Unfortunately, it is not collected at local levels for all of the selected cities reliably.   
The Bureau of Economic Analysis collects per capita income annually for each county in 
the US.  The data, obtained from income tax returns, is reliable and consistent.  For the selected 
cities, the per capita income of the county which encompasses the city was used.  For the City of 
New York, the five counties comprising the city were used.   These incomes were corrected for 
inflation through the use of the Bureau of Labor Statistics Consumer Price Index (CPI) corrected 
to 1980 to 1982 dollars.  The most local CPI was used for the corresponding city.  In only 4 
cities, a regional CPI was used. 
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The chart below shows per capita income for the corresponding selected cities from 1980 
through 2009.  While the chart shows a gradual increase in real income for most cities, the 
increases are not as dramatic when controlling for inflation.  Also, while there is some crossover 
of lines, the cities have predominantly kept their rank order in affluence through the 30 years. 
 
Figure 10 - Per Capita Income of Selected Cities 
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For per capita income, Las Vegas demonstrated the best effect.  Below is a chart of per 
capita income in Clark County versus Suppressible Crime in Las Vegas.  The chart shows an 
overall increase in per capita income in Clark County with a decrease in Suppressible Crime in 
Las Vegas.  While imperfect at certain points, the overall relationship between Economy and 
Suppressible Crime can be seen. 
 
 
Figure 11 - Clark County Per Capita Income vs. Las Vegas Crime 
 
The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) maintains records on employment, unemployment, 
hourly wages, and inflation on a yearly basis and may have data available at the county level.  
The data is collected from a variety of sources, but mostly state and county level.  Unfortunately, 
the BLS redefines industry classifications and has no method of reconciling older data.  This 
makes the use of BLS data with the exception of the Consumer Price Index impractical for time 
series analysis (Fayer, 2011). 
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The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) has the most reliable time series data of any 
national agency and has accurate data for Per Capita Income from 1962 onward by county for 
every county in the US.  The data is systemically collected yearly from state and national sources 
and is compared to data from the Internal Revenue Service for validity.  In the event that political 
boundaries such as a county line is changed or altered, BEA will readjust its older data to best fit 
the new political boundary.  This is the only data that was designed for time series analysis.  
Unfortunately, the BEA does not have yearly data by city (Dale, 2013).  There was no other 
suitable data available. 
4. Demographic Controls 
 
Previous studies have controlled for such variables using either decennial data or units of 
analysis that were either at the national or state level for demographic controls.  Unfortunately, to 
maintain the integrity of proper units of analysis at the city level, these controls had to be 
discarded. 
The US Census has a wealth of information on several demographic variables that may 
pertain to crime.  Specifically, percent female headed households, percent population black, 
percent population male and within certain ages, percent below poverty level, and percent 
receiving public assistance.  This data is collected down to the census tract for decennial 
censuses.  None of this data is available historically prior to 1990 and what data is available is 
limited to state level estimates (Ellis, 2013). 
Realizing this problem, the US Census developed the American Community Survey 
(ACS) in 2006 to gather more local data about the above mentioned variables among many more 
items of statistical data.  The survey is robust enough to use at a national level on a yearly level, 
but state level and large Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA) need to use a three year sample to 
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have any validity.  The US Census does not have any reliable yearly data ion the demographic 
controls sought for US cities (Ellis, 2013). 
Being unable to obtain data at the city level and finding no appropriate method of using 
county level data as a surrogate for demographic data with any reliability, the decision was made 
to remove these variables in order to reduce potential error or provide results whose reliability 
that may be artificially inflated.  This was an unfortunate decision, but has definitely opened an 
avenue to county level analyses with more controls for future research.  
5. Need for Municipalities to Address Limitations 
 
Having discovered a gap in social and economic indicators available for research at the 
city level, cities with large populations should provide or start to collect this data and make it 
available for external and internal research.  It is incumbent on municipalities with populations 
of a million or more to collect data on income, social conditions, age and gender distribution, and 
economic conditions.  Assuming these cities are collecting taxes, providing welfare and other 
social assistance, and administering schools, this data should be available. 
Cities that collect taxes can determine the overall economic status of their city as well as 
areas within cities.  While not all cities collect income tax, sales tax is collected by the 12 cities 
in this sample.  Income tax would probably be a better indicator of wealth of a city and 
determine the economic duress of individuals and families.  With listings of dependents, 
household status can be determined to a certain extent.  Sales tax is a good measure of 
consumption of consumer goods and will reflect the disposable cash available to people. While 
imperfect, sale tax can be an effective consistent measure of the health of a city. 
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Several welfare and social programs exist and are awarded to recipients based on their 
socio-economic status.  For example, the Women, Infants, and Children program (WIC) 
administered at the local level, could be used as a substitute measure the number of female 
headed households.  People receiving benefits should have some correlation to unemployment. 
Drug abuse treatment programs can provide an estimate of the number of substance abuse 
addicts that may be in the population. 
The administration of schools can provide gender and age distributions at a local level.  
Through direct administration of class sizes, very accurate estimates of gender breakdowns by 
age can be made and, to a certain extent projected for a few years after high school to some 
degree of reliability.  Cities that document the spoken language within household can also 
provide ethnic information of the student population.  Also, school subsidized lunch programs 
can be another economic indicator. 
Information is available at the local level for most cities, it is incumbent on city and 
police planning departments to understand the importance of this data and obtain it.  This is not 
to suggest that records of individuals should be directly handed over to law enforcement 
agencies, but summary data that may be helpful in planning current and future resource 
allocation should be collected.  This data should be collected and archived to provide historical 
perspectives and future research. 
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i
 According to Deputy Inspector Raymond Martinez of the NYPD’s Crime Analysis, Programs, and Planning 
Section, Part II offenses have not been reported since 2002 due to an ongoing contractual dispute with IBM.  IBM 
was contracted to provide the reports and have not produced the reports to this date. 
